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It is undoubtedly true, as [Justice Oliver Wendell] Holmes [Jr.] said that no
formulation of legal rules, in the criminal law or elsewhere, can be effective to
the degree that it is at cross-purposes with the beliefs and expectations of the
community. But one difficulty in applying this standard lies in the accurate
identification of what the prevailing consensus of those beliefs and
expectations is.'
-- Carl McGowan
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite accusations of racial profiling, only Sergeant James Crowley knows
what subjective motivations prompted him to arrest Harvard Professor Henry
Louis Gates, Jr., for disorderly conduct at his home in Cambridge,
1. Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972).
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Massachusetts, on July 16, 2009. 2  While reasonable people may disagree
about whether Officer Crowley engaged in racial profiling when arresting
Gates, it is undeniable that Gates's arrest exposed a long-standing rift between
some communities and the police officers who serve them. Following the
incident, the divisions that have long existed in the United States between
police and citizens became clear. Before a police panel conducted an
independent investigation into the matter, 3 and after President Barack Obama
publicly criticized the incident,4 police unions nationwide predictably defended
Officer Crowley's actions, citing his excellent record as an officer to dispute
the claim that Gates's arrest was racially motivated.5 Equally predictable was
the response of Gates's supporters and pundits who decried Gates's arrest as
emblematic of the racial profiling and indignities that minorities have suffered
historically. 6 Days after the incident, Officer Crowley and Professor Gates met
with President Obama and Vice President Joe Biden at the White House to
discuss the incident.7 Although the details of the Gates and Crowley meeting
with President Obama and Vice President Biden were not publicized, this
meeting symbolizes the dialogue between citizens and law-enforcement
officers that now must occur on a national scale.
The historical rift between police officers and the citizens they serve has
often caused communities to erupt in protests. An example of such unrest
unfolded after an officer with the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system shot
and killed unarmed, twenty-two-year-old Oscar Grant on New Year's Day in
2009.8 A week after Grant's shooting, over 200 people participated in
2. Abby Goodnough, Sergeant Who Arrested Professor Defends Actions, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 2009, at A3.
3. Id.
4. Helene Cooper, Obama Criticizes Arrest of a Harvard Professor, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
2009, at A20. When commenting on the arrest, President Obama said that the police had "acted
stupidly" by arresting someone shown to be living "in their own home." Id.
5. Id; see also Goodnough, supra note 2 (noting that law-enforcement groups believed
Crowley's actions were justified).
6. See Goodnough, supra note 2. For example, "the Congressional Black Caucus defended
[the President]'s remarks and called on Congress to address the issue of racial profiling." Id.
7. See Peter Wallsten & Mike Doming, Understanding Raised with Mugs, CHI. TRIB., July
31, 2009, at 12 (describing the White House meeting held over beers on a part of the lawn close
to the Rose Garden).
8. See Marisa Lagos, Video Shows Another BART Cop Apparently Striking Oscar Grant,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 25, 2009, at B2 (reporting on the shooting of Grant by police); see also Demian
Bulwa, BART Urges Patience Over Video of Shooting, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 5, 2009, at Al (detailing
the events leading up to Grant's shooting). Many witnesses captured Grant's shooting death on
video, and by most accounts, Grant was unarmed, subdued, and in handcuffs when Officer
Johannes Mehserle fatally shot him. See Lagos, supra. In the wake of the shooting, protests (at
times becoming violent) erupted around the Bay Area, signaling the community's discontent with
police officers and their interaction with citizens. See Demien Bulwa et al., Cop in Killing
Quits-Protest Turns Violent, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 8, 2009, at Al.
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protests-smashing storefronts, setting cars on fire, and blocking Oakland
streets. 9 Over "300 businesses and hundreds of cars" sustained damage as a
result of the protest. 10 To prevent tension between police and communities,
citizens and police officers must have a voice in shaping the practices and
policies that will impact their daily lives; they must also have the ability to
cultivate trust and to form partnerships committed to making communities
safe.
This Article proposes that policymakers should draw from the emerging
New Governance theoretical framework-particularly democratic
experimentalism-in order to develop strategies to sucessfully reform law-
enforcement agencies. Modem police departments function like administrative
agencies, and as such, they are susceptible to the same deficiencies that
traditional agencies experience in other administrative contexts. Given the
traditionally insular nature of law-enforcement agencies, the need for political
legitimacy in the reform process is amplified in the policing context.
Therefore, in order to eliminate patterns of police misconduct and corruption,
reform measures should embody characteristics that promote stakeholder
participation and local experimentation.
Law-enforcement officers are one of the few groups in society lawfully
empowered to use deadly force in executing their duties." Citizens give law-
enforcement officials wide discretion and great power to perform the
fundamental government duty of protecting the public. This vast discretion
raises the expectation that those police officers who wield it will be held
accountable if they abuse their power.' 2 Oscar Grant's death is a reminder that
the responsibility to address police misconduct or corruption rarely rests solely
with an individual, but rather, rests with the entire law-enforcement
institution.13 For example, abuses of police power raise important questions
regarding proper officer training for the use of their service weapons. What
role did supervisors play in this training? Have other officers previously
displayed inappropriate uses of force, and if so, how did the department
9. See Bulwa et al., supra note 8..
10. See Carolyn Jones, Storekeepers Tell of Terror, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 2009, at A12.
11. See GEORGE L. KELLING, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, "BROKEN WINDOWS" AND POLICE
DISCRETION 5 (1999).
12. See id ("Citizens should be concerned about controlling police: they have immense
authority; they are armed and authorized to use force; and unlike the military, they are not
sequestered on bases-they are spread throughout the community.").
13. BART recently reached a $1.5 million settlement in a wrongful death lawsuit filed on
behalf of Grant's minor daughter. Kristin Bender, BART Reaches S1.5 Million Settlement with
Mother of Oscar Grant's Daughter, OAKLAND TRIB., Jan. 28, 2010. Unrelated to the settlement
and consistent with the new paradigm of policing, BART has tripled the number of hours of
officer training required and now mandates that officers report all uses of force. Id.
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respond? Answers to these questions reveal important aspects of the
institutional police culture.
14
As in the Grant case, the civil unrest that often follows instances of police
brutality or misconduct is symbolic of the tensions between police officers and
citizens-especially between police and racial minorities. 15  Unfortunately,
Grant's death is merely one incident among many that reveal the institutional
failure of police departments to minimize police misconduct. Recently,
investigations in Philadelphia, 16 Atlanta,' 7 and Los Angeles' 8 have uncovered
egregious examples of police misconduct, which in some instances has resulted
in the criminal prosecution of the offending officers. 19 These alarming stories
demonstrate that without adequate accountability, the powers of the police are
prone to abuse. These instances further suggest that United States police
14. See generally INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT vii-xxiii (1991)
[hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT] (reporting widespread police misconduct in
Los Angeles and the failure of supervisors to discipline such misconduct).
15. See, e.g., id. at xii-xiv (discussing the tensions between the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) and minority groups).
16. See Sam Wood et al., Four Philadelphia Officers Lose Jobs Over Taped Beating, S.
FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, May 20, 2008, at 6A (observing that the Philadelphia Police Department
fired four officers for misconduct on May 5, 2008, after nineteen police officers pulled three men
from their car and beat them); see also Associated Press, 6 Cops Yanked Off Street After
Philadelphia Video, STAR-LEDGER, May 8, 2008, at 53 (reporting that investigators analyzed a
video of the May 8, 2008, beating to determine what disciplinary actions to take against officers);
Philadelphia Police Suffer Loss, Scrutiny (NPR News Weekend Edition radio broadcast May 10,
2008) [hereinafter NPR radio broadcast] (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld=90344016&ft=1&f-1001) (discussing whether the Philadelphia police
officers were justified in using force).
17. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Atlanta Police Officers Charged in
Connection with the Fatal Shooting of an Elderly Atlanta Woman 3 (Apr. 26, 2007) [hereinafter
2007 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/gan/press/
2007/04-26-07.pdf (announcing the indictment of Atlanta officers involved in the fatal shooting
of a ninety-two-year-old woman, which disclosed widespread police corruption, including lying
to magistrates to procure warrants and manufacturing evidence to cover up police misconduct).
18. See Frontline: LAPD Blues (PBS television broadcast May 15, 2001) (transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/etc/script.html) (reporting a
1998 incident during which Officer Rafael Perez was alleged to have used his position to procure
and sell illegal narcotics). In Los Angeles, the police department has been characterized as
creating a culture that tolerated police misconduct. See generally CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 14 (finding widespread police misconduct within the Los Angeles Police
Department). For example, in the late 1990s, many criminal convictions were overturned, and
several Los Angeles police officers faced prosecution when Officer Perez revealed extensive
police misconduct, including the routine placement of evidence on suspects, using physical
violence to coerce confessions, and even committing murder. See Andrew Blankstein, Perez
Details Gang Member Framing, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2005, at B4 (explaining that as a result of
the Officer Perez scandal, the LAPD fell under scrutiny by a federal judge in accordance with a
federal consent decree).
19. See supra notes 16-18.
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departments are not haunted by a few "bad apples," but instead are in dire need
of widespread institutional reform to transform police culture.
Police culture is in part responsible for the prevalence of police misconduct
and impedes meaningful police reform. The insularity of police institutions
and the solidarity of rank-and-file police officers create an impervious shield
around these institutions, which, by their nature, are most deserving of
transparency and public accountability. 2 Increasing police accountability,
however, is a tedious exercise because it must be done without alienating
police officers. Thus, penetrating police culture to ensure transparency
presents a key challenge to policymakers. Often, the very measures suggested
to remedy the problems associated with police culture further alienate the
officers and exacerbate tensions between them and the communities that they
21
serve.
Part 11 of this Article discusses the problematic role that the organizational
culture of law-enforcement agencies plays in fostering police misconduct and
corruption. This section contrasts the recent emphasis on institutional police
reform with the limited effectiveness of traditional approaches to addressing
police misconduct. In recent years, scholars have eschewed traditional, often
adversarial, mechanisms in favor of more comprehensive institutional reform
22of law-enforcement agencies, often called the "new paradigm" of policing.
The current federal response to police reform under the United States
Department of Justice's (DOJ) Pattern or Practice legislation represents a shift
from traditional adjudicatory approaches to comprehensive police reform.23
Part III conceptualizes police departments as administrative agencies and
explains how the current implementation of federal legislation aimed at police
accountability is analogous to traditional administrative rulemaking. The
similarity between police departments and administrative agencies means that
the new paradigm of policing inherently creates familiar problems associated
with traditional administrative rulemaking. Without careful and purposeful
20. See, e.g., Brandon v. Allen, 645 F. Supp. 1261, 1266-67 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (describing
a "code of silence" within police departments that pressured officers to refrain from testifying
against each other); see also David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 481 n.60 (1992) (discussing the unwritten, but recognized, "code
of silence" within police departments).
21. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at xiv (stating that law-
enforcement policies emphasizing "crime control over crime prevention" lead to the alienation of
the officers from the community).
22. See Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The US. Justice
Department "Pattern or Practice" Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 6 (2003)
[hereinafter Walker, The New Paradigm] (referring to the federal government's police-reform
efforts under federal legislation as the "new paradigm of police accountability").
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006) (authorizing the attorney general to conduct
investigations and, if warranted, obtain "equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate" a "pattern
or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers ... that deprives persons of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States").
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planning to avoid these pitfalls, the same political legitimacy problems that
have plagued administrative rulemaking and top-down approaches to
institutional reform in the past will threaten the success of current police-
reform efforts. Presently, stakeholders, including both citizens and police
officers, have no voice in the reforms, and as a result, it may prove difficult for
them to embrace the recommended reforms. Unlike traditional methods of
addressing police misconduct, however, the current framework for federal
intervention offers the novel opportunity to explore pragmatic approaches to
law-enforcement reform by involving those stakeholders most affected by the
reform process.
To resolve the political legitimacy issues inherent in police reform, Part IV
asserts that New Governance theories should influence existing responses to
police reform, particularly the federal government's efforts under its Pattern or
Practice legislation.24 Given the unique characteristics of police culture and
the historical tensions between police and residents of certain communities,
shifting to a bottom-up approach-a hallmark of New Govemance programs-
is preferable to ensure the political legitimacy of police reform. In particular,
police-accountability measures should embrace democratic experimentalism-
25
a subset of the New Governance theoretical framework. The New
Governance theoretical framework addresses "traditional policy needs but
operat[es] outside the traditional, formal legal infrastructure" and is generally
"characterized by the greater participation and collaboration of non-traditional
players, the use of consensus building mechanisms, reliance on peer review
and collaboration, and the integration of public-private partnerships and
.... ,,26
research experiments into the formal policy-making process. Embracing
characteristics of democratic experimentalism, such as stakeholder engagement
and local experimentation, allows for much-needed federal oversight without
sacrificing local needs.
Part V argues that the same justifications for replacing the archaic
command-and-control model of policing with community-policing models are
relevant when considering institutional police reform. The principles
underlying community policing are similar to those principles underlying the
New Governance rationale and, in particular, democratic experimentalism.
The shift to community policing, characterized by bottom-up approaches to
24. See id. § 14141(a) (prohibiting a pattern or practice of police misconduct within police
departments).
25. See Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the
Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 351,
393-94 (2008) ("Experimentalist approaches are part of a constellation of so-called 'new
governance' methods originally advocated in industrial and managerial context, and since applied
to fields including government regulation of social problems." (citations omitted)).
26. Christina Simpson, Policy as a Process: The Pedagogical Role of the EU in Health
Care, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 293, 302 (2007-2008) (citations omitted).
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problem solving and police-citizen collaboration, supports the notion that
police-citizen partnerships are beneficial to both community members and
police officers. Community policing also establishes a precedent for police
and communities to work together toward the common goal of neighborhood
safety. This Part concludes that the current implementation of the DOJ's
Pattern or Practice legislation, although a promising reform model, remains
deficient when viewed through the lens of democratic experimentalism.
However, several changes in the implementation of police accountability can
ensure that the reform process more adequately reflects the ideals of
democratic experimentalism and thus is more likely to result in better and more
sustainable reforms.
II. THE NECESSITY OF SYSTEMICALLY REFORMING LOCAL LAW-
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: A PARADIGMATIC SHIFT
Police misconduct has been and continues to be a persistent problem in the
United States. 27 The term "police misconduct" connotes the image of a violent
police beating, reminiscent of the widely televised Rodney King incident.28 In
reality, however, police misconduct extends beyond actual violence and may
take many forms, including failing to cooperate in investigations involving
29 31fellow officers, racial profiling, 0 falsifying warrant affidavits,3' planting
27. See, e.g., 5 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTICE: 1961 COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS REPORT 26 (1961) ("[P]olice brutality in the United States today is a serious and
continuing problem." (citation omitted)); 4 U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE &
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (1931) (stating results of a
1931 investigation and finding that police misconduct was widespread); see also 2007 Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 17 (announcing police misconduct in a 2006 shooting
of a ninety-two-year-old woman by police).
28. See The Rodney King Affair, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1991, at BI (chronicling the events
of March 3, 1991, when Los Angeles police officers beat Rodney King while being videotaped).
29. See Alan Feuer, 3 Ex-Officers are Sentenced for Roles in Louima Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2000, at B3 (reporting that three officers were sentenced after covering up the assault of
a man in custody by another officer); Alan Feuer, Officer Convicted of Lying, in Last of the
Louima Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2000, at B3 (discussing the conviction of an officer for
attempting to cover up police brutality); see also Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from
Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1310 n.3 (2001) (discussing the
conviction of police officers for covering up police misconduct).
30. See, e.g., Richard Winton, Sheriff Settles ACLU Claim Over Racial Profiling, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at 35 (noting that the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department settled a
claim, which alleged that the Department stopped and searched African American students from
the Los Angeles Trade-Technical College because of their race).
31. See, e.g., 2007 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 17 (describing the
practices employed by some Atlanta police officers who secure warrants based on false
information in order to satisfy their performance target goals).
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evidence on suspects,32 and perjury during a criminal trial.33  Traditional
methods to curb police misconduct have missed the mark because of their
inability to transform police culture. 34 The inability of local authorities and
adjudicative methods to address these issues effectively has prompted calls for
increased federal oversight, requiring local police departments to change their
internal practices and increase transparency and accountability.
35
A. Police Organizational Culture Defined
In recent years, police experts examining the nature and causes of police
misconduct have concluded that the roots of police misconduct rest primarily
within the organizational culture of policing.36  There is now widespread
support for the proposition that police officers are not "independent agents" of
the police agencies for which they work; rather, officers are individuals who
operate within a "powerful organizational culture that significantly influences
and constrains their judgments and conduct." 37  Experts in police practices
have identified several unique aspects of the organizational structure within
law-enforcement institutions that tolerate and encourage a culture of police38
misconduct. Three key components characterizing police culture include: (1)
the phenomenon known as the "blue wall of silence ; (2) the lack of effective
32. Don Terry, Officers' Corruption Trial Under Way in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2000, at A12 (noting that several officers involved in the Los Angeles Rampart corruption
scandal were charged with planting evidence and giving false testimony).
33. See, e.g., Springer v. Coleman, 998 F.2d 320, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming the
aggravated-perjury conviction of a police officer who falsely testified that he had never abused or
mistreated a prisoner in his custody).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 102-242, at 137 (1991) (finding that the Department of Justice "lacks
the authority" to correct patterns of police misconduct effectively).
35. See id. at 136-37 (determining that widespread police misconduct was persistent in
some of the nation's largest urban centers, including New York and Boston).
36. See, e.g., ALLYSON COLLINS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE:
POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 33, 45 (1998) (reporting
that many of the problems identified in police departments across the nation shared an
organizational component); CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at xiv-xv
(discussing the Los Angeles Police Department's management culture and its relation to police
misconduct); MILTON MOLLEN ET AL., THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION REPORT:
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT 51 (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN
COMMISSION REPORT] ("Police culture-the attitudes and values that shape officers' behavior-
is a critical component of the problem of police corruption today."); Barbara E. Armacost,
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 493-94 (2004)
(detailing the organizational roots of police brutality).
37. Armacost, supra note 36, at 476.
38. See generally id. at 495-505 (highlighting weaknesses within the organizational
structure of law-enforcement institutions that promote police misconduct and excessive force).
39. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and
Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITr. L. REV. 233, 237 (1998)
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identification and discipline of problem officers; and (3) the widespread belief
among various levels and ranks of police officers that some violence or
brutality is a necessary part of effective policing.40 These organizational
characteristics foster an "us [versus] them" mentality between the officers and
41the communities that they serve.
1. The Blue Wall of Silence
The code of silence, also known as the "blue wall of silence, ' '42 is an
unwritten code that "[g]enerally ... refers to the refusal of a police officer to
'rat' on fellow officers, even if the officer has knowledge of wrongdoing or
misconduct., 43  Although it is not part of an officer's formal training, the
indoctrination of this code often begins at the inception of a police officer's
career. From the time he or she enters the police academy, a police cadet is
introduced to the concept that it is unacceptable to report the misconduct of
other officers.4 The ubiquitous nature of this code of silence in police culture
and its impact on police accountability is virtually undisputed.4 5 Several courts
(describing the "blue wall of silence" as an "unwritten code" that "prohibits disclosing perjury or
other misconduct by fellow officers").
40. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at ix-x; see also
Armacost, supra note 36, 498-99 (noting that police violence was encouraged in the work
environment).
41. See David Crump, The Social Psychology of Evil: Can the Law Prevent Groups from
Making Good People Go Bad?, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1441, 1442 (quoting former LAPD officer
Rafael Perez's testimony at his sentencing hearing where he explained that "[t]he 'us against
them' ethos of the overzealous cop began to consume me"); see also Rebecca Rader Brown, The
Gang's All Here: Evaluating the Need for a National Gang Database, 42 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 293, 324 (2009) (observing that police actions to "target[] gangs through suppression
efforts may increase an 'us [vs.] them' mentality already prevalent in many minority
neighborhoods, where fear and resentment of police are commonplace" (second alteration in
original)); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 71
(2009) (explaining that discretionary decisions about "how we police and what we police" tend to
'reinforce[] walls of'us' versus 'them"').
42. See Chin & Wells, supra note 39, at 237.
43. See Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 64 (2000) [hereinafter Gilles, Breaking the
Code of Silence]; see also Rudovsky, supra note 20, at 481 n.60 (describing the code of silence as
"an unwritten rule and custom that police will not testify against a fellow officer and that police
are expected to help in any cover-up of illegal actions").
44. See Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling of
the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 234 (2000) (commenting on the
duty of loyalty to other officers that is charged to a rookie officer).
45. See Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence, supra note 43, at 63-64 (stating that the
"'code of silence' is a well-documented phenomenon" dating back to New York's "Boss Tweed
gang of the 1840s"); see also Armacost, supra note 36, at 468 (noting that "police officers
sometimes lie about police-citizen encounters").
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have even recognized the existence of a code of silence within police culture,
46
noting that the code of silence facilitates police corruption and misconduct.
Understanding why the code of silence persists in police institutions is
imperative for developing effective measures to dismantle it, thus allowing for
greater transparency and accountability. How and why does the code of
silence develop among police officers? Scholars examining the prevalence of
the code of silence have noted that it is "firmly rooted in a commitment to
group loyalty. 47 This group loyalty has developed because of the inevitable
distinction between the "universe" of police culture and "civilians. ' '48 Scholars
have invoked militaristic parallels to describe the evolution of this
phenomenon, noting that police officers perceive themselves as "'us'-the
brave warriors-against 'them'-the rabble of the street., 49 This separation of
cultures prompts "[p]olice ... to see themselves as 'under siege' by the very
neighborhood communities whom they are sworn to protect, as well as by the
political establishment, their own internal affairs unit, and anyone else seen as
the voice of the outsiders. '50  The embattled police-the "insiders"--view
"outsiders" as "the enemies who are assaulting . . . the 'brothers on the
force.' '5 1 Thus, the "[b]rothers band together, protecting their own and what
the group as a whole stands for." 52 Just as brothers in a military unit band
together for mutual safety, security, and defense, police culture has developed
the "brotherhood in blue."5 3
The dangers associated with group loyalty are exacerbated when police
officers are killed in the line of duty. In recent years, several individuals
suspected of being involved in the deaths of officers have died in police
46. See Sledd v. Lindsay, 102 F.3d 282, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing the lower court's
ruling to find that the claimant stated a valid claim by alleging that police officers operated under
a code of silence); Mason v. Stock, 955 F. Supp. 1293, 1313-14 (D. Kan. 1997) (discussing
"general orders" given by police officers to obey the code of silence by actions such as "testifying
to less than the whole truth" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brandon v. Allen, 645 F. Supp.
1261, 1266-67 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (holding a Tennessee city liable for using the code of silence
to facilitate abusive behavior in the local police department).
47. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483, 555 (2006).
48. Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing and the Police, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL'Y
74, 76-77 (2005) (noting that feelings of respect and loyalty for their peers prompt officers "to
abide by the code of honor and to heed the obligation of silence"); see also Chin & Wells, supra
note 39, at 240 (referencing the "loyalty obligation" that coincides with the code of silence).
49. Taslitz, supra note 47, at 555.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. ld
53. Armacost, supra note 36, at 453-54.
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custody under suspicious circumstances. 54  For example, suspect Ronnie
White's death while in police custody in Prince George's County, Maryland,
raises several unanswered questions about the conduct of correctional officers
within that facility. 55 On June 29, 2008, correctional officers found White
dead in his cell. Because he was facing first-degree murder charges for killing
a county police officer, authorities suggested that White may have tried to end
his own life before authorities could convict him.56  Preliminary autopsy
reports, however, dispelled suicide theories and concluded that White's death
was a homicide. 57 The conditions surrounding White's death are particularlydistrbin beausethey• • 58 •
disturbing because they suggest that his homicide was an inside job. White
was held in a maximum-security unit, and only three guards were on duty on
the morning of his death. 59  This evidence suggests that either the law-
enforcement officers actively participated in White's death, or they knew who
killed him and failed to come forward with relevant information, despite their
sworn oath to uphold the law.
60
The White case bears a striking resemblance to the police beating of Adolph
Archie, who was suspected of killing New Orleans police officer Earl Hauck in
1990.61 Archie allegedly fired fatal shots at Officer Hauck and officers
subsequently shot him as he fled the scene, "knock[ing] him off his feet." 62
The officers who apprehended Archie then proceeded to beat him until he was
nearly unconscious. The officers then drove him to the emergency room, but,
54. See, e.g., Aaron C. Davis et al., Man Accused of Killing Pr. George's Officer Dies,
WASH. POST, June 30, 2008, at Al (reporting the death of a man in police custody "less than 36
hours" after he was charged with killing a police officer).
55. Id. On June 29, 2008, correctional officers found Ronnie White dead in his jail cell in
Prince George's County, Maryland. Id.
56. Charging documents against White accuse him of "intentionally" accelerating a stolen
pick-up truck toward Prince George's County Corporal Richard S. Findley and fatally striking
him.
57. Davis et al., supra note 54, at 101.
58. White was being held in a maximum-security cell where cloth or ropelike material was
prohibited and guards checked his cell every thirty minutes. Furthermore, five medical examiners
from across the country have stated that it would have been impossible for White's injuries to be
self-inflicted. An autopsy report revealed that White was strangled possibly with "a sheet, a
towel or the crux of [an] elbow." See Derek Kravitz, Timeline: Prince George's Jail Murder
Probe, (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.co.pg.md.us/Govemment/PublicSafety/
Police/CrimePE/pdfs/July2008ucr county.pdf.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has opened a civil-fights probe into White's death and
two correctional officers have been named as persons of interest in the case and placed on
administrative leave. Id.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
61. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE & THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 33-34 (1993).
62. Id.
63. Id at 34.
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contrary to established procedure, they did not take him inside; instead, they
transported him to the police station before he received treatment. 64 Once the
police finally returned Archie to the hospital, he had suffered two skull
fractures, broken teeth, a broken larynx, bleeding testicles, and other injuries
65
consistent with being kicked. Twelve hours later, Archie died from his
66injuries.
Despite the problems associated with police solidarity, there are nevertheless
positive aspects of group loyalty among officers. In fact, the loyalty
characteristic among police officers is often referred to as a desirable trait of
effective police officers. 67 Indeed, some scholars have described this loyalty as
"necessary to effective police work, promoting, at its best, acts of heroic daring
and self-sacrifice, a sense of group cohesion, mission, and responsibility."
6
Andrew Taslitz notes:
Loyalty enables officers to endure difficult times, adding meaning to
their daily tasks by linking their fate to that of a greater whole and, at
its best, also linking them to higher values, the sense of loyalty to the
noblest of ideals. Loyalty provides a sense of safety in the face of
danger, a sense of belonging in a world of isolation, a sense of virtue
in a daily stew of suspicion and corruption.
69
Despite the positive attributes of loyalty among police officers, this group
loyalty creates dire consequences for officers who betray it. While
investigating the New York City Police Department (NYPD), the Mollen
Commission noted several ways that the code of silence allows police
misconduct to flourish. First, the Commission noted that the code of silence
creates "a standard that nothing is more important than the unswerving loyalty
of officers to one another.' 70 Second, the Commission noted that the code of
silence "thwart[s] efforts to control corruption." 71 These findings reiterate that
the code of silence can be detrimental to any reform efforts within a police
department.
The pervasive nature of the code of silence is particularly troubling because
it not only affects corrupt officers who are actively engaged in misconduct, but
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Similarly, in May 2008, a news helicopter filmed several Philadelphia police
officers beating three motorists during a traffic stop. See Wood et al., supra note 16. The beating
came a few days after a Philadelphia police officer was killed during a response to an armed
robbery. See NPR radio broadcast, supra note 16.
67. See KELLING, supra note 11, at 6 ("Police work, in this view, as Egon Bittner once said,
could be conducted by persons who have 'the manly virtues of honesty, loyalty, aggressiveness,
and visceral courage."' (quoting EGON BIYTNER, ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 6 (1990))).
68. Taslitz, supra note 47, at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. (citation omitted).
70. MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 51.
71. Id.
2010]
Catholic University Law Review
it equally impacts honest officers who are not directly involved in wrongdoing.
Officers who actively participate in stealing department property or "roughing
up" suspects are assured that colleagues will not reveal their misconduct for
fear of retribution. Officers who report the misconduct of their fellow officers
risk being labeled as "rats" or informers and experiencing systematic alienation
from other officers. For example, in White-Ruiz v. City of New York, Officer
Paula White-Ruiz reported to supervisors her suspicions that her partner had
stolen a large sum of money from the body of a man they found dead in his
apartment. 72 Her reports led to an investigation that resulted in the discharge
of her partner.73 Immediately, White-Ruiz's fellow officers began harassing
her by vandalizing her car, tampering with her locker, and making threatening
phone calls to her home. 74  The White-Ruiz case demonstrates that police-
reform efforts are hindered by the code of silence and loyalty among officers.
Honest officers find it difficult to report the misdeeds of others, and this
reluctance negatively impacts efforts to reform police agencies and discipline
culpable officers.
2. Hard-Nosed Tactics and Violence as Part of the Job
Another troubling aspect of police culture is the sometimes violent nature of
the job. Every day, police officers must face the harsh reality that they may be
killed or injured in the line of duty. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
reported that in 2007, 57 United States law-enforcement officers were killed
and 59,201 officers were assaulted while performing their duties. 75 Statistics
like these prompt many police officers to adopt the belief that a certain amount
of violence is necessary to protect themselves and execute their duties as
officers. Viewing the police as an occupational group, scholars such as
William Westley have explored the use of violence by the police and the ways
in which police officers have justified the use of violence through their
occupational experiences.76 Westley found that when describing situations in
72. White-Ruiz v. City of New York, 983 F. Supp. 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (summarizing
the harassment that White-Ruiz suffered after she reported a fellow officer for wrongdoing); see
also Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence, supra note 43, at 69-71 (discussing White-Ruiz and the
retaliation directed against the officer for breaking the code of silence).
73. White-Ruiz, 983 F. Supp. at 368.
74. Id. at 368, 371.
75. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS KILLED & ASSAULTED: TABLE 1 (2008), http://www.fbi.gov/ucrkilled/
2007/data/table_01.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED & ASSAULTED: TABLE 65 (2008),
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2007/data/table_65.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter
TABLE 65]. The rate of officer assaults in 2007 was 11.4 per 100 sworn officers, with 26.1% of
the officers assaulted sustaining injuries. TABLE 65, supra.
76. See WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF
LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORALITY 121-22 (1970) (reporting the responses of seventy-four
policemen asked to describe situations when they felt the use of force was necessary).
[Vol. 59:373
A Democratic Approach to Police Reform
which police officers believed they were justified to use force, the responses
could be grouped into one of these nine categories: "[d]isrespect for the
police," "[o]nly when impossible to avoid," "[t]o obtain information," "[t]o
make an arrest," "[f]or the hardened criminal," "[w]hen you know [a] man is
guilty," "[tf]or sex criminals," "[f']or self-protection," and "[w]hen pressure is
on you."' 7  Similarly, the Mollen Commission found that this toleration and
intentional use of violence is "not limited to street-level cops but extend[s] to
supervisors who . . . tend[] to turn a blind eye to evidence of unnecessary
violence around them."
78
This endemic culture of violence is tolerated or even condoned by some
police departments. Several commissions studying the issue have commented
on the "unnecessarily aggressive" policing style that characterizes many police
departments. 79 The Mollen Commission noted that although "most officers
[we]re genuinely sickened" by egregious instances of brutality, many officers
willingly tolerated violence toward suspects. 8 Additionally, the Christopher
Commission, which examined the policies and practices of the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) in the wake of the Rodney King beating, found that
the LAPD emphasized crime control over crime prevention and rewarded
"hardnosed" tactics.8s  Officers were evaluated in part based on statistical
measures such as the number of "arrests made" and the number of "calls
handled. 82 The LAPD also trained officers to engage in aggressive crime-
control techniques resulting in a high rate of street encounters. 83  The
Commission concluded that the combination of these strategies resulted in a
"siege ['us versus them'] mentality" between officers and citizens.84 Similarly,
New York City's aggressive quality-of-life policing initiatives, which
encouraged custodial arrests for misdemeanor offenses,85 resulted in increased
77. Id. at 122.
78. Armacost, supra note 36, at 501 (quoting MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
36, at 49).
79. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at xiv; see also Armacost,
supra note 36, at 499-501 (detailing the findings of the Christopher Commission, the Kolts
Commission, and the Mollen Commission, all of which indicated that police brutality is a
systemic problem).
80. See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 49 (noting that many officers do
not oppose the use of"a few blows and bruises now and then").
81. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at xiv ("Witness after witness
testified to unnecessarily aggressive confrontations between LAPD officers and citizens,
particularly members of minority communities.").
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291, 292 (1998) (explaining the quality-of-life initiatives as "an
order-maintenance policing strategy").
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citizen complaints against the police. 86
The "us versus them" characterization of police-community relations is
particularly prevalent in minority communities. 87  Unnecessarily aggressive
police violence is troubling in itself, but racial disparities involving the victims
of police misconduct are even more disturbing. 8  These disparities create a
perception within minority communities that police are not trustworthy and, in
some instances, should be feared. 9
3. Ineffective Supervision and Discipline of Police Officers
In addition to the code of silence and aggressive policing styles, ineffective
supervision and inadequate discipline contribute to an organizational police
culture that facilitates police misconduct. In its July 1991 report, the
Christopher Commission concluded that "there is a significant number of
officers in the LAPD who repetitively use excessive force against the
public." 90  The Commission. also found that police department management
condoned this behavior "through a pattern of lax supervision and inadequate
86. See id. at 377-78 (noting the "sharp increase" in citizen complaints against the police
upon the initiation of order-maintenance policing).
87. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 987 (1999) (noting that officers often see their jobs in terms
of "us vs. them"); see also Hon. Milton Mollen, Police Violence: Causes and Cures, Edward V
Sparer Public Interest Law Fellowship Forum, Brooklyn Law School, April 15, 1998, 7 J.L. &
POL'Y 75, 95 (1998) (discussing the "us against them" attitude).
88. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 23-26, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1
(1985) (No. 83-1035) (citing statistical information related to the disproportionate numbers of
African Americans and Hispanics who are victims of police violence); see also 1. Bennett Capers,
Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 845-46 (2008) [hereinafter Capers,
Testilying] (noting that police brutality is common among minority communities).
89. See, e.g., KATHERYN K. RUsSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE
FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 46
(1998) (discussing racial profiling and noting that "for young Black men, the police represent
Public Enemy number one"). As Professor Jerome Culp explained, this fear and suspicion of the
police among minorities transcends age, class, and social standing. See Jerome McCristal Culp,
Jr., Notes from California: Rodney King and the Race Question, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 203-
04 (1992-1993) (describing Culp's own negative experiences with law enforcement).
90. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at iii. The Commission further
elaborated that
[t]he failure to control these officers is a management issue that is at the heart of the
problem. The documents and data that we have analyzed have all been available to the
Department; indeed, most of this information came from that source. The LAPD's failure
to analyze and act upon these revealing data evidences a significant breakdown in the
management and leadership of the Department. The Police Commission, lacking
investigators or other resources, failed in its duty to monitor the Department in this
sensitive use of force area.
Id. at iv.
[Vol. 59:373
A Democratic Approach to Police Reform
investigation of complaints." 91 Instead of being fired, demoted, or otherwise
disciplined for poor behavior, many of the officers who were the subject of
complaints had been promoted or received positive performance evaluations.
92
In many instances, supervisors did not mention complaint history when
completing performance reviews for officers, even though the complaint
information was readily available.93 Further complicating matters, "the LAPD
apparently had no overall system or plan for keeping track of more generalized
data involving officer uses of force, excessive or otherwise. 94 Among other
things, the LAPD lacked important features, including the following: (1) an
auditing procedure for use-of-force reports; (2) a "mechanism for monitoring
force-related civil damages suits and settlements for purposes of officer
discipline or training"; and (3) a systematic method to review officers "with
multiple complaint histories involving [the use of] excessive force." 95 Scholars
have long recognized that efforts to address police misconduct, no matter how
sincere, are doomed to fail if they consistently focus on the behavior of
individual officers rather than the "distinctive and influential organizational
96
culture" of police institutions. The following section explores the traditional
mechanisms used to remedy police misconduct and their inherent inability to
confront the root causes of police misconduct and corruption.
B. Traditional Remedies and Their Failure to Address Systemic Issues
Plaguing Police Agencies
Traditional measures used to address police misconduct include the
following: excluding evidence illegally obtained from criminal suspects,
97
9 1. See Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 816 (1999) (discussing the Christopher Commission's
findings); see also CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 32, 158.
92. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 40-42.
93. See id. at 41-42.
94. Armacost, supra note 36, at 497.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 455; see also SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 61, at 187 ("[I]f police reform is to be
more than window dressing, it must be supported by the powerful institutions among which
police organizations exist.").
97. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in
violation of a suspect's constitutional rights will be excluded). The underlying (and much
debated) rationale for the exclusionary rule is that exclusion of the evidence would deter police
officers from engaging in constitutional violations. See id 657-58. But see Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968) (noting that many routine police functions related to evidence gathering
render the exclusionary rule "ineffective as a deterrent"). Scholars have questioned the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule and its ability to reach police-citizen encounters that are not subject
to adjudication. See Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 18-25 (2001) (discussing the exclusionary rule, civil-rights actions,
administrative discipline, and commission reports as models for preventing police misconduct);
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imposing civil sanctions on police officers engaged in wrongdoing, 98 imposing
municipal liability for police misconduct,99 prosecuting officers engaged in
misconduct under state or federal law, °0 performing internal investigations of
police misconduct and implementing internal disciplinary measures,' 0 l and
see also John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 806-11
(discussing the limits of federal prosecution of law-enforcement officers under 18 U.S.C. § 242).
98. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Victims of police misconduct may file civil actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id. Critics of civil actions argue that these remedies are ineffective strategies to combat police
misconduct because municipalities almost always indemnify the individual police officer so that
the officer does not pay the costs of the defense or any penalties imposed by the suit. See Alison
L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is Ineffective in Deterring Police
Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 759-60 (1993) (observing that in practice, the victim of police
misconduct challenges the entire municipality when filing a § 1983 suit). Furthermore, critics
argue that civil-litigation strategies are rarely successful in targeting flawed management,
policies, or patterns of abuse. Id. at 792, 797-99.
99. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (establishing that
a municipality may be held liable under § 1983).
100. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (providing a federal remedy for police misconduct).
Experts have eschewed state and federal criminal prosecutions of police officers as ineffective
means to address institutional reform of police agencies. See Jacobi, supra note 97, at 802-11
(discussing problems with state and federal prosecution of police misconduct). Prosecutors in
many cities rarely prosecute officers for police brutality, and the failure to prosecute officers is
often attributed to the inherent conflict of interest that exists between prosecutors' offices and the
police officers upon whose work the prosecutors rely to secure convictions. See id. at 803-04.
When states are errant in prosecuting officers for unlawful actions, the federal government may
decide to prosecute the officers under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242. Section 241 makes it unlawful for
"two or more persons [to] conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person ... in the
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same." 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2006).
Section 242 provides that it is unlawful for a person acting "under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, [to] willfully subject[] any person in any State, Territory,
Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006).
Despite the availability of federal intervention, DOJ officials have often asserted that state
prosecution is the preferred avenue for criminal prosecutions of law-enforcement officers and that
federal intervention should serve only as a "backstop." See Police Brutality Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 3
(1991) [hereinafter Police Brutality Hearings] (statement of John R. Dunne, then-Assistant Att'y
Gen., Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice) (suggesting that federal
prosecutions should be secondary to state and local prosecutions).
101. See PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 79
(1995) (explaining that the NYPD created an Internal Affairs Division to combat police
misconduct following the findings of the Mollen Commission). These investigations, often
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establishing citizen complaint-review boards.'0 2 Experts have criticized these
traditional approaches to police misconduct for various reasons. All of these
traditional remedial measures are litigation-based and adjudicatory in nature.
Each measure has been criticized by experts:' 0 3 although the adjudicatory
nature of these measures makes them well-suited to addressing individual
incidents, they offer little hope in spurring systemic change because they fail to
emphasize proactive problem-solving. Given the shortcomings of these
remedies to address police misconduct, the potency of injunctive relief appears
to be the best approach for eradicating problematic practices within an agency
and forcing troubled agencies to implement reforms. In many contexts
involving constitutional violations, litigants have successfully advocated for
injunctive relief to facilitate structural reform within institutions: for example,
injunctive remedies have been used to structurally reform school systems and
prisons.'04 In the context of police reform, however, the prospect of injunctive
perceived as illegitimate, are plagued by conflicts of interest existing among the officers. See id.
at 79-80 (observing that in the Internal Affairs Division of New York City's Police Department,
high-ranking "officers did not want to root out corruption, both because it might threaten their
jobs and because they wanted to maintain a good image for the department"). The blue code of
silence also makes it difficult for investigating officers to gather information regarding alleged
instances of police misconduct. See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 51-52
(noting that the code of silence "thwart[s] efforts to control corruption" because police officers
"refus[e] to provide information about serious corruption in their commands"); Gilles, Breaking
the Code of Silence, supra note 43, at 84-85 (discussing the lack of cooperation police officers
experience when investigating fellow officers).
102. See Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Citizen Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 653, 654-55 (2004) (noting that although citizen review boards were established to encourage
transparency in police investigations, critics of citizen complaint review boards have noted that
the retrospective investigation of complaints is inadequate to identify and prevent police
misconduct).
103. See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 36, at 465 (recognizing that three primary obstacles
curbing police misconduct are: practical obstacles, doctrinal obstacles, and the "individual-
specific and incident-specific nature of civil rights litigation"); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing
Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1399-1401 (2000) [hereinafter Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform
Litigation] (stating that traditional approaches have not addressed systemic police misconduct);
Patton, supra note 98, at 771-72 (stating that traditional approaches fail because the actual "cost"
to individual officers is minimal and the expense to police departments is viewed as an acceptable
cost of doing business); Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the
Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 323 (2005) (studying oversight of police departments
and noting that "the ensuing wrangling between those who favor and those who oppose such
oversight deflects attention from the underlying issue-how best to police police corruption").
104. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1978) (demonstrating the use of a
structural injunction to require compliance with prison reform); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (applying injunctive relief to aid school desegregation);
see also OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNcTiON 4-6 (1978) (arguing for the availability
of injunctive relief in civil rights cases); Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation, supra
note 103, at 1402 (highlighting the importance of the DOJ's authority to provide injunctive relief
to compel structural reform).
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relief has been limited because courts are reluctant to allow structural
injunctions to reform police agencies and have severely limited injunctive
relief in this context because of federalism concerns. Some courts have
adopted the view that it is not the role of federal courts or the federal
government to monitor local police departments. 10 5 For example, in Rizzo v.
Goode, the United States Supreme Court refused to grant injunctive relief to
citizens challenging the Philadelphia Police Department on the basis of police
misconduct.' °6  Furthermore, in United States v. City of Philadelphia, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the federal
government lacked "implied statutory authority to sue a local government or its
officials to enjoin violations of citizens' constitutional rights."'10 7 Similarly,
the Supreme Court's decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons prevents private
citizens injured by police misconduct from seeking injunctive relief, absent the
(almost impossible) ability to show a likelihood of future harm.' 
08
C. The "New Paradigm " of Police Accountability: The Current Federal
Response to Addressing Institutional Police Reform
Recognizing the inability of traditional methods to compel systemic reform
of police agencies, policymakers advocated the need for and developed a "new
paradigm" of police accountability designed to address the core factors of
problematic police culture-factors such as poor management and
105. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380-81 (1976) (reversing the grant of
injunctive relief, reasoning that principles of federalism prevent an injunction designed to govern
the functions of a police department).
106. See id In Rizzo, the Court considered the availability of an injunction against the City
of Philadelphia that required the police department to implement reforms in its citizen complaint
process. Id. at 364-65. The Court reversed the lower court's grant of the injunction, holding that
the patterns or practices of constitutional violations were insufficient to grant standing to the
victims of the abuse. Id. at 375.
107. United States v. City of Phila., 644 F.2d 187, 198-99 (3d Cir. 1980).
108. See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-13 (1983). In Lyons, a Los Angeles
resident sued the City after police officers administered an unprovoked chokehold that rendered
him unconscious following a routine traffic stop. Id. at 97-98. The Lyons dissent noted that from
1975 to 1982, sixteen people died as a result of LAPD-administered chokeholds and that it was
Los Angeles city policy to permit officers to use chokeholds even without a threat of violence.
Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Lyons was awarded damages for his injury, but the
Supreme Court held that Lyons lacked standing to obtain an injunction restricting the use of
chokeholds because he could not demonstrate a substantial likelihood that he would be choked
again. Id. at I 11. The Lyons holding limits the use of injunctive relief as a technique for curbing
police misconduct because unless a person harmed by police misconduct can show a substantial
likelihood that he or she will suffer the same harm again (which is unlikely), that person lacks
standing and an injunction is not proper. Id. at 11; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-242, at 138
(1991) ("To ensure that the issues being litigated are not hypothetical, and to provide a court with
the benefit of a factual context, the [Omnibus Crime Control] Act [of 1991] requires that a private
citizen seeking injunctive relief have been injured by the challenged practice.").
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organization. 10 9 Congress responded to this call by enacting 42 U.S.C. §
14141, codi ,'ing a new cause of action for regulating unlawful police patterns
or practices. Section 14141 authorizes the DOJ to obtain injunctive relief
for the goal of reforming internal practices of law-enforcement agencies where
the DOJ determines either that a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
violations exists or that violations of federal law persist.", The DOJ's
enforcement authority under § 14141 is triggered when the DOJ learns that a
local police department may be engaging in such unlawful practices. 12 Once
the DOJ is informed of the alleged unlawful practices, it conducts a
preliminary investigation by reviewing witness interviews and other
pleadings-including depositions or testimony-in order to determine whether
a pattern or practice of constitutional violations exists.13 If the preliminary
investigation reveals sufficient evidence of the allegations, the DOJ then
launches a formal investigation. 1 4 If the formal investigation reveals a pattern
or practice of constitutional violations, § 14141 authorizes the DOJ to file a
109. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 97-106 (demonstrating a
correlation between the LAPD's management culture and police misconduct); COLLINS, supra
note 36, at 45 (discussing the failures of traditional police management); Armacost, supra note
36, at 493-94 (detailing the organizational origin of police brutality).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006). The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1993 included the 1991 provision authorizing the attorney general to pursue injunctive relief for
patterns of police abuse.
111. Id. Section 14141, entitled "Cause of action," provides:
(a) Unlawful conduct
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person
acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct
by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with
responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles
that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
(b) Civil action by Attorney General
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of
paragraph (1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States,
may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the
pattern or practice.
Id.
112. See Oversight of the Department of Justice-Civil Rights Division: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 18-19 (2002) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement
of Ralph Boyd, Jr., Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Division, United States Department of
Justice) (describing the attorney general's process for filing a § 14141 action).
113. Id. In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ralph Boyd, Jr., then-
Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ Civil Rights Division, compared the process to making "a
[§] 1983 assessment ... as to whether there is some formal policy or some unspoken practice that
is leading to some level of repetitive unconstitutional uses of authority by police officers." Id. at
19.
114. Id.
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lawsuit against the law-enforcement agency under investigation., 15 In practice,
however, the DOJ typically refrains from filing lawsuits, preferring instead to
negotiate agreements in consent decrees or Memoranda of Agreement (MOA)
with the culpable police departments.11 6 Most recently, the DOJ's practice has
been to send technical assistance letters merely notifying the police agency of
existing problems and suggesting reforms.
1 17
An integral feature of this new paradigm of policing is ensuring increased
transparency, and this is the first step in dismantling the culture of insularity
that permeates police departments. 118  This new paradigm emphasizes
changing police systems rather than focusing on individual police officers; it
encourages the collection and analysis of systemic data to identify recurring
problems. There is also recognition that both internal and external
accountability strategies can be beneficial to the reform process."9
The reform measures developed by the DOJ directly respond to the aspects
of police culture previously discussed. For example, problems such as lax
supervision and poor monitoring can be ameliorated by improved
recordkeeping and tracking abilities. Unlike the adjudicative nature of the
traditional methods of addressing police misconduct, the new paradigm
115. See id.
116. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department Files Police Misconduct
Lawsuit Against the City of Columbus, Ohio (Oct. 21, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of Justice], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/1999/October/494cr.htm
(noting that the DOJ "prefer[s] to bring about needed changes in the police department through
negotiations, rather than contested litigation"). The DOJ has entered into court-enforced consent
decrees with local law-enforcement agencies in the following locations: Los Angeles, California;
Steubenville, Ohio; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Prince George's County, Maryland; Detroit,
Michigan; Cincinnati, Ohio; Washington, District of Columbia; and the state of New Jersey. See
infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. The DOJ also filed a lawsuit against the Police
Department in Columbus, Ohio, but subsequently dropped the suit after determining that
Columbus was in compliance with the constitutional principles. 1999 Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, supra.
117. See, e.g., Letter from Shanetta Y. Cutlar, Chief, Special Litig. Section, Civil Rights
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Frank James, Attorney, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/
split alabaster talet_ 1I09_04.pdf (detailing the DOJ investigation of the Alabaster, Alabama,
Police Department and outlining concerns identified regarding the department); Letter from
Shanetta Y. Cutlar, Chief, Special Litig. Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Kerry Drue, Attorney Gen., U.S. V.I., Elton Lewis, Office of the Police Comm'r, V.I. Police
Dep't & Daniel Mattarangas-King, Office of the Police Comm'r (Oct. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/virgin islandpd_talet_10-5-05.pdf (discussing the
DOJ investigation of the U.S. Virgin Islands Police Department and requesting production of
additional documents to aid the investigative efforts).
118. See Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 100, at 3 (explaining that in police reform,
federal enforcement efforts serve only as a "backstop" to other resources). The DOJ stated that
the role of remedying police misconduct "properly lies with the internal affairs bureaus of law
enforcement agencies and with State and local prosecutors." Id.
119. See Walker, The New Paradigm, supra note 22, at 8-9.
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encourages prospective solutions to identify problems within police institutions
before police misconduct can manifest. In the agreements between the DOJ
and the police departments, the most common provisions include (1) the
development of an early warning tracking system; (2) the collection of use-of-
force reporting; and (3) the creation of a civilian complaint review process.120
1. Implementing an Early Warning Tracking System
Identifying officers who exhibit a pattern of misconduct can have a
significant impact on preventing constitutional violations within the
department as a whole. In order to meet this goal, the federal government has
required many jurisdictions to devise and implement an early warning tracking
system or early intervention system to identify "problem" officers within the
department. 121 This requirement stems from the concern that a small number
of police officers within a department are typically responsible for the majority
of the police misconduct within the department. A notable example of this
phenomenon is the Christopher Commission analysis of complaints against
1800 Los Angeles police officers between 1986 and 1990.123 According to the
Commission's report, 1400 of the 1800 officers had only one or two
allegations. 124 In contrast, "183 officers had four or more allegations, 44 had
six or more [allegations], 16 had eight or more [allegations], and one had 16
allegations. 125 The Commission found that "[t]he top 5% of officers ranked
by number of reports accounted for more than 20% of all reports, and the top
10% accounted for 33%." 126 Even if only a small number of officers are
involved, these figures demonstrate the need for reform at an organizational
level, because they indicate that little is being done at a departmental level to
identify, discipline, or retrain these officers to improve their conduct. Despite
120. See id. at 6-7 (setting forth best practices for police accountability); see also U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY: EXAMPLES OF PROMISING POLICE
PRACTICES AND POLICIES 3-20 (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojp/
186189.pdf [hereinafter DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY]
(outlining best practices and concepts for "promoting police integrity"). Many of these same
principles form the basis of the reforms required by consent decrees and MOAs developed by the
DOJ under § 14141. See Walker, The New Paradigm, supra note 22, at 7 (observing that the best
practices generated by the DOJ are included in § 14141 consent decrees and MOAs).
121. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY, supra note
120, at 10 (recommending that several jurisdictions implement early warning tracking systems
better to identify "at-risk conduct").
122. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 31; SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra
note 61, at 21.
123. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 36.
124. Id.
125. Id. Similarly, when examining the use-of-force reports involving 6000 officers from
January 1987 to March 1991, more than 4000 of the officers had fewer than 5 reports each, but
the Commission noted that 63 officers had 20 or more reports each. See id
126. Id.
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engaging in a pattern of misconduct, many of these "problem" officers in Los
Angeles avoided both negative personnel evaluations and disciplinary action;
in some instances, these officers were promoted in spite of their misconduct. 
27
In order to address patterns of misconduct, the federal government issued
consent decrees or MOAs, recommending the development of an early warning
tracking system in the following locations: Los Angeles, California;1 28 the New
Jersey State Police;' 29 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;' Prince George's County,
Maryland; 13 1 Steubenville, Ohio; 132 Cincinnati, Ohio; 133 and Washington,
District of Columbia.'
34
When early warning tracking measures are in place and working correctly,
identifying officers who engage in misconduct or who are the subject of
numerous complaints may significantly impact the number of complaints
recived by a department. These officers, at a minimum, may need retraining,
or they may be disciplined or fired. Similarly, officers will be on notice that
the department is monitoring their behavior, and this transparency, in itself,
may encourage officers to modify troubling behavior. Finally, easily
identifying problem officers will no longer allow supervisors to feign
127. See, e.g., id at 41 (reporting that evaluations of the forty-four officers receiving six or
more complaints were generally "very positive" and "failed to give an accurate picture of the
disciplinary histories of these officers"). Many of the performance evaluations did not reference
any of the complaints against the officers, prompting the Commission to note that "the picture
conveyed in an officer's personnel evaluation file was often incomplete and commonly at odds
with contemporaneous comments appearing in the officer's ... complaint files." Id. For specific
examples of those inconsistencies, see id. at 42-47.
128. Consent Decree, United States v. City of L.A., No. 00-11769 GAF, 7 39-52 (C.D. Cal.
June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Los Angeles Consent Decree], available at http://www.justice.
gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.php.
129. Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (MLC), 40-56 (D.N.J.
Dec. 30, 1999) [hereinafter New Jersey Consent Decree], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/
split/documents/jerseysa.php.
130. Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, 12 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997)
[hereinafter Pittsburgh Consent Decree], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/
pittssa.php.
131. Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice & Prince
George's County, Maryland, & the Prince George's County Police Department, 75-84 (Jan.
22, 2004) [hereinafter Prince George's County MOA], available at http://www.justice.gov/
crt/split/documents/pgpd/pgmemoagree.pdf.
132. Consent Decree, United States v. City of Steubenville, 71-77 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3,
1997) [hereinafter Steubenville Consent Decree], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/
documents/steubensa.htm.
133. Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice & the
City of Cincinnati, Ohio, & the Cincinnati Police Department, 57 (Apr. 12, 2002) [hereinafter
Cincinnati MOA], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/Cincmoafinal.php.
134. Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice & the
District of Columbia & the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, 2 (June 13,
2001) [hereinafter District of Columbia MOA], available at http://www.justice.gov/crtlsplit/
documents/dcmoa.php.
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ignorance regarding problem officers. Supervising officers who fail to act on
information available as part of the early warning tracking efforts may also be
held accountable for the conduct of those problem officers within their unit.
These accountability measures may undermine part of the rationale for the
police code of silence, particularly where supervisors are concerned, if the
supervisors' positions and prospects for upward mobility are linked to
alleviating corruption and misconduct within their unit.
2. Implementing Use-of-Force Reporting Systems
In addition to the early intervention systems, another important component
of some of the consent decrees and settlement agreements is the requirement
that local police agencies either develop and implement use-of-force reporting
systems or modify their existing use-of-force policies to require better
supervision after an officer uses force. 35 The consent decrees and agreements
typically address "substantive use of force polic[ies], incident reporting
requirements, the investigation of force incidents, and entry of force reports
into a departmental early intervention (EI) or risk management system.' 13  For
example, jurisdictions may be required to "implement a use of force policy that
is in compliance with applicable law and current professional standards."'
37
Alternatively, the MOAs and consent decrees might require specific reforms
that limit certain practices, such as the deployment of canines, the use of
particular chemical agents, or the use of certain physical restraints.
38
Beyond the substantive modifications of use-of-force polices, administrative
rulemaking in the various consent agreements extends to the investigations
surrounding uses of force. Generally, the provisions in the agreements are
designed to correct problems in the investigative process and maintain the
integrity and impartiality of the investigation. For example, the Prince
George's County MOA contains requirements related to critical firearm
discharges.' 39 Not only does the Prince George's County MOA require the
police department to investigate all critical firearm discharges, but it also
requires that each department create a special board to review such
discharges.
140
While the substantive changes in use-of-force policies may alleviate
unnecessary uses of force and reduce citizen complaints, the most important
135. See, e.g., id. at 9 53. These policies mandate that officers "notify their supervisor
immediately following any use of force or receipt of an allegation of excessive use of force." Id.
136. Walker, The New Paradigm, supra note 22, at 33.
137. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Consent Decree, supra note 130, at 9 13.
138. See, e.g., Prince George's County MOA, supra note 131, at 99 35-39 (detailing
revisions and augmentations to the police department's policy regarding use of the chemical
agent, Oleoresin Capsicum, commonly known as pepper spray).
139. Jdat 46-48.
140. Id. at947.
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aspect regarding the use of force relates to how and under what circusmstances
the local police department conducts investigations. If officers know that they
will need to document every use of force or explain such force to a special
board, they may be reluctant to use force in situations in which it is not
warranted, such as in some instances, discussed by Westley, when individuals
disrespect an officer. Such requirements may encourage officers to resolve
situations with more appropriate uses of force or no force at all. Again, like
the early warning tracking system, efforts to train, monitor, and investigate
uses of force directly address some of the core problems of police culture,
particularly that the department either condones or tolerates such inappropriate
uses of force and the belief that violence is necessary in certain situations.
3. Devising a Civilian Complaint Process
Another common provision of consent decrees and negotiated MOAs calls
for either the improvement of the police department's existing citizen
complaint process or the development of a new system to handle citizen
complaints. 14  Provisions related to the civilian complaint process generally
focus on facilitating the methods by which citizens can file a complaint. A
common provision might require the police department to allow citizens to
make complaints in writing, verbally, by mail, by telephone, by facsimile, or
by e-mail, and may further require the police department to provide a
confidential twenty-four-hour telephone hotline to record complaints against
officers. 142  Beyond delineating the methods for receiving complaints, a
common reform provision may stipulate the manner in which complaints are
processed and investigated. 143 For example, the Los Angeles consent decree
required the police department to make audio or video recordings of all
complainants-including the officers and witnesses involved-in addition to
investigating the scene of the incidents to secure evidence. 144
141. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY, supra 120, at
7. The DOJ's report, Principles for Promoting Police Integrity: Examples of Promising Police
Practices and Policies, sets precedent for many of these policies; the report states that law-
enforcement agencies have an obligation to "provide a readily accessible process in which
community and agency members can have confidence that complaints against agency actions and
procedures will be given prompt and fair attention." Id. The report details the acceptance of
misconduct complaints, stating that "[l]aw enforcement officers should be required to report
misconduct by other officers." Id.
142. See, e.g., id at 7-8.
143. See, e.g., id at 8.
144. Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 128, at T 80(a)-(b).
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN LOCAL POLICE REFORM:
ANALOGIES TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT
Policing and police reform have historically been a local function, and thus
the emergence of a federal response to police accountability-such as that
embodied in § 14141 145-marks a departure from previous reform efforts. 146
The need for federal intervention, however, is clear: the insular nature of law-
enforcement institutions and the inability of traditional mechanisms to bring
about changes in police culture require federal attention. In forging ahead with
this new paradigm of police accountability, policymakers and scholars must
anticipate obstacles that threaten to impede the progress of police reform. In
this context, the similarity between police departments and traditional
administrative agencies becomes apparent. Additionally, a key component of
the agreements between the DOJ and municipalities is the emphasis on
administrative rulemaking as a tool to guide officers' conduct in the field,
establish investigatory protocols, and implement supervisory review. 147 In this
sense, the new paradigm of police accountability is analogous to the
experience of administrative agencies during rulemaking. Given the emphasis
the federal government has placed on reforming internal practices and policies
of local police departments, and the active role that the federal government
plays in the process, the implementation of new rules under the new paradigm
makes the reform process susceptible to many of the ills associated with
traditional administrative rulemaking. Drawing from the administrative
rulemaking context helps to anticipate potential pitfalls associated with federal
intervention in police reform.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006).
146. Bill Lann Lee, former DOJ Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights
Division, noted the preference for handling police misconduct locally stating, "The arm of
government that principally polices the police is the local district attorneys and the state attorneys
general." Interview with Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, US
Department of Justice, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 119, 121 (1999). Lee nevertheless added that
[i]t is important ... for the federal government to have that back-up jurisdiction, because
sometimes in our nation's history, the local authorities have not prosecuted the police
when they have engaged in misconduct. That hasn't happened as a systemic matter in
many years. But it is still important that the federal government have that jurisdiction.
Id
147. See Walker, The New Paradigm, supra note 22, at 14 (explaining that administrative
rulemaking "lies at the core of the new paradigm of police accountability").
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A. Conceptualizing Police Departments as Administrative Agencies
Although rarely viewed through the lens of administrative law, 148 police
departments operate in a manner similar to traditional regulatory agencies.
149
In the traditional regulatory context, agencies promulgate regulatory rules
because of their expertise in certain substantive areas. Police departments
operate in the same way, but rather than determining emission standards for a
particular factory or the lead content of a particular product, they determine
which citizens will be arrested for certain criminal violations and which
citizens will not. Additionally, police determine how they will effectuate an
arrest, what level of force will be used in making an arrest, what interrogation
methods will be employed, and whether they will stop or report the misconduct
of fellow officers. Finally, police departments, often without external
oversight, decide whether and how the department will discipline officers who
have engaged in misconduct. Indeed, more than thirty years ago, Kenneth
Culp Davis recognized that "police are among our most important
policymaking administrative agencies."'150  Similarly, Judge Carl McGowan
noted that police "departments have begun to look and act more like other
large governmental agencies under the discipline of embodying their principles
of action in visible rules."'
15 1
Rules governing the operations of individual police officers and police
departments are especially important given the peculiar position police occupy
in democratic societies. The very power necessary to administer crime control
may, at times, be at odds with the ideals of democracy. As Hudson Janisch
and Ron Levi observe, "[e]ven if one can remedy specific tensions or clarify
particular misconceptions, it is arguable that the symbiotic antagonisms
between policing and democracy are simply intractable."'' 52 They further state
that "[w]hile interdependent, the relationship between the two tends to turn
148. See Michal Tamir, Public Law as a Whole and Normative Duality: Reclaiming
Administrative Insights in Enforcement Review, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 43, 44 (2006) (noting that
police and prosecutors are rarely considered part of the administrative-law context "despite the
fact that they are precisely the governmental actors who most directly intervene in people's
lives," and despite the enormous discretion afforded to them by the American legal system).
149. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REV.
703, 703-04 (1974) ("Top officers, not subordinates, should determine major policy."); see also
Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 717 (2005) (observing the lack
of scholarly commentary on whether administrative law principles can be applied appropriately to
criminal-justice agencies and examining agencies responsible for criminal-justice policies on
sentencing).
150. Davis, supra note 149, at 703; see also Barkow, supra note 149, at 717 (applying
administrative-law principles to the Federal Sentencing Commission).
151. McGowan, supra note 1, at 667. Judge McGowan further noted that police are
governed by rules that are developed externally. Id.
152. Hudson Janisch & Ron Levi, Criminal Justice from the Bottom-Up: Some Thoughts on
Police Rulemaking Processes, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 243, 246 (Michael
Taggart ed., 1997).
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adversarial, since police carry both the responsibility to protect fundamental
rights and freedoms as well as the power to abuse them."83 Recognizing the
vast amount of discretion afforded to police officers and the relative insularity
of police institutions, scholars have advocated administrative rulemaking
within police departments to serve as a check on this discretion and encourage
institutional change.1 54  In the realm of deadly force, rulemaking has had
"salutary effects on the frequency with which officers use their firearms."', 55
Police rulemaking is also beneficial because it provides transparency to the
public.156 Kenneth Culp Davis argued that "open" police rulemaking is "more
likely to be based on enlightenment" than on "ignorance," unlike the informal
rules that police officers adopt in their day-to-day experiences. 157 Proponents
of police rulemaking also promote the benefit of public comment, which
subjects the rules to public scrutiny and encourages community
involvement.1
58
In addition to the similarities between police departments and administrative
agencies, federal intervention in police reform offers additional support for
applying principles of administrative law. Although not related to search and
seizure policies, interrogation techniques, or discretionary police conduct, the
practices and policies that the federal government seeks to implement in local
jurisdictions under § 14141 are essentially administrative rulemaking
measures. The primary difference is that these predominantly procedural
153. Id.
154. See Davis, supra note 149, at 704-05. In his seminal article, Anthony Amsterdam
argued that police "[r]ulemaking would ... tend to tame the welter of police practices that now
come before courts for fourth amendment adjudication by preventing some of those practices
from being used in the first place." Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 421 (1974); see also Samuel Walker, Controlling the Cops: A
Legislative Approach to Police Rulemaking, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 361, 362 (1986) (acknowledging
that by the mid-1970s, many scholars agreed on the need for administrative rulemaking to guide
police conduct).
155. Robert E. Worden, The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police Use
of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE 23, 29 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
156. See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515,
603-04 (2000) [hereinafter Luna, Principled Enforcement] (advocating transparent police
rulemaking to guide police in the use of force and other practices).
157. See Davis, supra note 149, at 717. Davis notes that many illegal police practices "are
created by personnel with an average education of 12.4 years, are made by the least qualified
personnel at the bottom of the organization, and are responses to portions of problems and not to
whole problems." Id.; see also Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1166
(2000) (remarking that requiring legitimacy is particularly important in the criminal-justice
system because the "power to deprive liberty and self-autonomy through the criminal process is
unparalleled").
158. See, e.g., Jason W. Eldridge, Comment, The Fourth Amendment: The Privacy of
Overhead Luggage Compartments on Commercial Buses, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2003,
2025-26 (2001) (examining rulemaking in the context of the Fourth Amendment and observing
that rulemaking benefits the community by permitting public scrutiny of police procedures).
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measures are designed to spur systemic changes within the police department
to improve police accountability. By way of analogy, the DOJ attorneys, in
conjunction with police consultants, provide "expertise" to local police
departments subject to § 14141 under negotiated consent decrees or MOAs in
the same way that other federal regulatory agencies provide expertise to state
and local entitities. These local police departments are charged with
implementing federal policies charged to them by the DOJ. 5 9 The DOJ
monitors the progress of the police-department reforms and has the authority to
seek legal action if the local departments do not comply.' As the similarities
between police departments and agency rulemaking become more apparent,
policymakers must be cautious of the problems associated with conventional
rulemaking that could undermine the reforms that the DOJ implements in a
particular jurisdiction.
B. The Inherent Democratic Deficiencies in Administrative Rulemaking: The
Search for Political Legitimacy
Although there is a demonstrated need for the federal government's
involvement in local police reform, either through its enforcement authority
under § 14141 or another mechanism, federal intervention inherently begets
issues of political legitimacy. Below, I argue that these political legitimacy
issues apparent in the traditional rulemaking context are even more acute in the
police-reform context.
In traditional informal rulemaking, the federal agency promulgating the rule
drafts the text of the proposed rule.1 6 1 After comment within the agency, the
proposed rule is printed in the Federal Register, and the public is invited to
comment.162 After reviewing the comments, the agency evaluates issues
identified during the comment period and may choose to revise the rule.
63
The final rule is then published in the Federal Register and is later incorporated
into the Code of Federal Regulations. 
164
Erik Luna articulates a number of benefits associated with rulemaking
generally. 165 For example, rulemaking allows people to identify unacceptable
159. See Eugene Kim, Note, Vindicating Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141: Guidance
from Procedures in Complex Litigation, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 767, 773, 794-95 (2002)
(discussing the DOJ's negotiation of consent decrees at the local level rather than large-scale
litigation).
160. See, e.g., Prince George's County MOA, supra note 131, at 113-14, 116-17.
161. See Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 156, at 594-96 (describing the informal
administrative rulemaking process).
162. Id. at 595-96.
163. See id.
164. See Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 134-35 (1985) (describing the traditional rulemaking
process).
165. See Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 156, at 597.
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conduct and modify their behavior according to legal standards.1 66  The
capacity for the public to share information causes some to contend that
rulemaking results in superior decision-making.' 67  Similarly, rulemaking
provides accountability and promotes citizen participation in articulating
principles-a process that "increases popular compliance based on perceptions
of government legitimacy."
'1 68
Despite the benefits of rulemaking, scholars have criticized the process,
arguing that traditional rulemaking "has marched steadily toward reliance on
the judiciary to settle disputes and away from direct participation of affected
parties. ' '169  Specifically, critics have noted that where inherently political
questions are at issue, rulemaking "has resulted in a crisis of legitimacy that is
the current malaise."
170
In the United States, agencies set forth standards regarding almost every
aspect of social and economic activity. 171  Given the complex and often
controversial issues governed by regulatory policies, the importance of
democratic legitimacy in promulgating regulations cannot be overstated.
Nevertheless, "unelected government officials" make most regulatory policy,
therefore giving rise to what Cary Coglianese terms a "democratic deficit."'
Officials involved in rulemaking decisions are not elected, and as a result, they
are not publicly accountable.1 73 These individuals, however, play major roles
in developing rules that affect the public at large. 174 Thus, citizen participation
during the comment period, either in public hearings or advisory committee
166. Id.
167. Id
168. Id.
169. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 113
(1982).
170. Id. at 17. The Administrative Conference of the United States recommended negotiated
rulemaking as a means of increasing direct participation in administrative rulemaking. 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.82-4 (1983). Federal law defines negotiated rulemaking as "rulemaking through the use of
a negotiated rulemaking committee"; such committee is defined as "an advisory committee
established by an agency . .. to consider and discuss issues for the purpose of reaching a
consensus in the development of a proposed rule." 5 U.S.C. §§ 562(6), (7) (2006); see also Cary
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46
DUKE L.J. 1255, 1256 n.6 (1997) (defining "negotiated rulemaking" and noting that sometimes
"regulatory negotiation" is used interchangeably with "negotiated rulemaking" despite the
technical distinction between the two phrases); Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The
Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 33 & n. 1 (2000) (noting
that "regulatory negotiation," or "reg-neg" as it is commonly referred, is sometimes described as
"negotiated rulemaking").
171. See Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information Technology and the Regulatory
Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 353, 354 (2004) (noting that federal regulations "govern virtually
every major aspect of contemporary life").
172. Id.
173. Id. at372.
174. Id.
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meetings, is beneficial in preserving the democratic legitimacy of the
promulgated rule.
175
In addition to the democratic deficit, scholars have articulated several
additional reasons why informal rulemaking fails to create "effective,
implementable, and legitimate rules."' 76 Professor Jody Freeman observes that
"the indirect nature of rule making tends to undermine problem solving and
reward adversarialism."'' 77 She continues by noting that the extreme positions
held by parties during the notice and comment period force the agencies to
choose from a limited range of possible solutions. 178  Another concern
Freeman notes is that "only after the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM)
do parties supply detailed arguments about the technical and practical
difficulties of implementing a rule, instead of much earlier when the
information might be more valuable to the agency in formulating the proposed
rule."'1 9  Thus, policymakers should not underestimate the benefits of
stakeholder participation and local experimentation early in the administrative
rulemaking process. As the following section demonstrates, the emerging New
Governance theoretical framework supports greater stakeholder participation in
general regulatory initiatives and may cure the democratic deficits inherent in
the federal government's efforts to reform local police departments.
IV. NEW GOVERNANCE AND POLICE REFORM: A DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIMENTALIST APPROACH
A. New Governence Defined
New Governance theories that advocate a bottom-up approach to regulatory
reform directly address the democratic deficit inherent in regulatory
rulemaking and may help to restore political legitimacy in the administrative
rulemaking context. The command-style regulatory model emerged as the
dominant regulatory model in the wake of New Deal-era policies and the
proliferation of administrative agencies and administrative rulemaking during
the 1960s and 1970s. 18  Throughout this period, administrative agencies
operated on the assumption that issues plaguing the government were far too
complex for the general public to participate actively in developing
175. Id.
176. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1,11(1997).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 11-12.
179. Id. at 12.
180. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply: "New Governance " in Legal Thought and in the World:
Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473-74 (2004).
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solutions.1 8 1 The prevailing notion was that agencies developed expertise in
particular substantive areas and thus were best equipped to develop the
appropriate policy response. 82 This model resulted in "one-size-fits-all rules"
instead of nuanced responses to policy problems.'
83
Scholars characterize New Governance theories as a paradigmatic shift away
from top-down regulation and toward flexible, pragmatic approaches to
regulation developed from the bottom up.184 New Governance theories offer a
dramatically different response to the democratic legitimacy problems
plaguing policy reform efforts in a number of contexts. 185 In contrast to the
command-and-control regulatory framework, the New Governance regulatory
model, according to its advocates, "breaks with fixity, state-centrism,
hierarchy, excessive reliance on bureaucratic expertise, and intrusive
prescription." 186 The New Governance model of regulatory reform "aspires
• . . to be more open-textured, participatory, bottom-up, consensus-oriented,
contextual, flexible, integrative, and pragmatic.'' 187  By increasing public
participation, the New Governance model creates an opportunity for a diverse
influx of expertise and experience by "involving more actors" in each step of
the process. 88 This in turn allows for the promulgation of regulations more
closely tailored to the needs of those for whom the regulations are intended.
189
New Governance is not a single theory, but rather, it reflects a synthesis of
related approaches to governance intended to remedy ineffective forms of
regulation. 190
181. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 270 (1998).
182. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 373 (2004).
183. Karkkainen, supra note 180, at 474 (explaining that the uniform rules "in truth ... did
not quite fit anyone").
184. See, e.g., Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New
Governance Experiment, 2006 WiS. L. REV. 645, 673.
185. See Karkkainen, supra note 180, at 474-75. Scholars have analyzed a wide range of
public-policy issues through the lens of the New Governance theoretical framework including,
"environmental protection, public school reform, 'problem solving courts,' health care reform,
workplace gender discrimination, equal protection generally, labor rights, community policing,
community economic development, and public law litigation." Id. at 475 (citations omitted).
186. Id. at 474.
187. Id
188. Lobel, supra note 182, at 373.
189. See id at 373-74 (advocating citizen participation in regulatory reform in order to
address broader policy goals).
190. Karkkainen, supra note 180, at 496.
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B. Democratic Experimentalism
Democratic experimentalism is a subset of the broader New Governance
framework. Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel define democratic
experimentalism as an "overall system of public problem solving that
combines federal learning with the protection of the interests of the federated
jurisdictions and the rights of individuals."' 91 Democratic experimentalism
refers to innovative methods of regulation and policy development that utilize
"robust public participation, benchmarking, and information sharing to solve
public problems."' 192 Democratic experimentalism has also been described as a
form of governance in which "decentralization and experimentation will
ultimately lead to the advancement of knowledge."' 93  It seeks to address
typical democratic shortcomings through its encouragement of collective
problem-solving and local expertise in responding to regulatory initiatives.
194
Essentially, democratic experimentalism seeks to improve governmental
effectiveness in policymaking by promoting information sharing, institutional
best practices, and citizen engagement. Scholars have identified several
characteristics of democratic experimentalism, including its commitment to
benchmarking best practices, learning by monitoring, encouraging direct
stakeholder deliberation, and engaging in local experimentation.
195
Benchmarking is "an exacting survey of current or promising products and
processes which identifies those products and processes superior to those the
company [or agency] presently uses, yet are within its capacity to emulate and
eventually surpass. ' 6  Learning by monitoring involves the exchange of
information between agencies, regular evaluation of progress, and continuous
adjustment of means to reach stated ends. 197 Dorf and Sabel envision direct
citizen participation through governance councils that would assess the utility
of services provided by local agencies and compare the progress among similar
agencies. In Dorf and Sabel's view, the governance councils link citizens to
government but do not replace current administrative leadership. 99 Agencies
191. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 181, at 288.
192. Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX.
L. REv. 819, 822 (2008) (book review essay).
193. Kruse, supra note 184, at 677.
194. See Doff & Sabel, supra note 181, at 430-31 ("Our anti-commandeering principle only
requires that when the federal government does find it attractive to enlist the states directly in its
regulatory programs, it does so by offering them the possibility of true cooperation.").
195. Solomon, supra note 192, at 822.
196. Dorf& Sabel, supra note 181, at 287.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 316-17.
199. Id. at 319.
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would remain accountable to a department head, who in turn is accountable to
the directly elected executive.200
C. New Governance in Action in the Criminal-Justice Context
There are several aspects of the criminal-justice system for which courts and
policymakers have advocated practices or programs that embody New
Governance characteristics. The jurisprudence of the Warren Court, for
example, represents the Court's recognition that local or state experimentalism
could play a key role in developing rules related to criminal procedure. This
understanding is evident in the Court's opinions interpreting the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments and in its decision in Miranda v. Arizona.2 0 1  Katherine
Kruse notes specifically that "[t]he Court announced its rule[] in ... Miranda
• . . with the explicitly stated goal of encouraging legislatures and law-
enforcement agencies to take their own steps to improve police investigatory
practices. ' 'z 2 In Miranda, the Court recognized that states and localities could
exercise "their creative rule-making capacities" to develop alternatives for
203protecting the privilege against self-incrimination.
Kruse analyzes reforms that the state of Wisconsin has implemented to
address wrongful convictions. For example, in 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court interpreted the state constitution to prohibit impermissibly suggestive
identifications even if the identification was deemed to be reliable. This
holding represented a departure from federal due process that allows
suggestive identifications if they are otherwise reliable. That same year, the
Wisconsin state legislature mandated that local law-enforcement agencies
develop written policies for eyewitness identification procedures in the hope of
decreasing the possibility of mistaken identification. 206 Specifically, the bill
"mandate[d] the electronic recording of all juvenile custodial interrogations,
and declare[d] a state policy that all custodial interrogations of adults in felony
200. See id.
201. See Kruse, supra note 184, at 663-67; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
202. See Kruse, supra note 184, at 671. Kruse discusses United States v. Wade, in which the
Court held that "the postindictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution" and thus
required the presence of counsel. 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967). The Court noted, however, that
"[lI]egislative or other regulations" of lineups might "remove the basis for regarding the stage as
critical" for puposes of determining whether there is a right to counsel. Wade, 388 U.S. at 239
(internal quotation marks omitted); see generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 181 (discussing
Miranda v. Arizona in experimentalist terms).
203. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
204. State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 599 (Wis. 2005).
205. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106, 114 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
199-200 (1972).
206. Kruse, supra note 184, at 647.
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cases should be electronically recorded. 2 °7  Under the Wisconsin reforms,
local agencies are developing and periodically reviewing their policies;
because the authority to develop these practices is left to the local agencies,
Kruse argues that these policies fall within the democratic experimentalist
paradigm.
20 8
Dorf and Sabel have described drug treatment courts as "evolving
experimentalist institutions."20 9 These specialized courts typically allow the
defendant to plead guilty or accept responsibility for the criminal violation,
but, as an alternative to incarceration, defendants are placed in a court-
mandated drug-treatment program.210 If the offender sucessfully completes
treatment, the conviction is usally expunged. 211 The courts necessarily require
the cooperation of judges with "administrative, not-for-profit, or private-sector
organizations. '" 212  Consistent with the principles of democratic
experimentalism, information is pooled among each of these groups, and the
progress of individuals is subject to intense monitoring. Dorf and Sabel note
that the "information . . . allows identification of good and bad performers,
improvement of the quality of the monitored information, and eventually, of
the services provided. 213  This collaboration allows actors collectively to
"explore and evaluate solutions to complex problems that neither alone would
have been likely to identify, much less investigate or address, without the
exchanges with the others."
214
D. Democratic Experimentalism Principles and Police Accountability: The
Value of Stakeholder Deliberation and Local Experimentation
The value of stakeholder deliberation and local experimentation emphasized
in the democratic experimentalist paradigm are values readily applicable in the
context of police reform.215  The public distrust created by insular police
institutions threatens the political legitimacy of police reform because it lacks
transparency and citizen involvement. By employing a democratic
experimentalist approach to police reform, policymakers can eliminate
207. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. §§ 175.50, 938.31, 968.073, 972.115 (2006)).
208. Kruse, supra note 184, at 648. For a detailed discussion of the legislation and the
agency's responsibilies, see id. at 648 n.10.
209. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts & Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 837 (2000).
210. Id. at832.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 833.
213. Id. at 833-34.
214. Id. at 834.
215. See Kruse, supra note 184, at 678-79 (describing the characteristics of the democratic
experimentalist model).
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deficiencies in police culture, dissolve historical tensions between police and
communities, and restore political legitimacy to the police-reform process.
Democratic theorists have emphasized that "citizens should participate in the
design and implementation of the policies that affect them." Adhering to
these values may create not only better substantive reforms, but may also
increase the legitimacy of the ultimate police reforms implemented in a
particular jurisdiction. In their discussion of the values deliberation, Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson identify several distinct values of
deliberation, each of which has special relevance in the context of police
reform. 2 17  Gutmann and Thompson note that opportunities for citizens to
engage in "deliberative forums" allow groups previously excluded from the
political realm to participate in the political process.21 8  Specifically, the
tension experienced between police officers and communities, especially poor,
minority communities, can be traced to the political disenfranchisement these
community members have historically experienced.
The opportunity for police officers and community members to deliberate
about police conduct and police-citizen interactions is key to dismantling the
"us versus them" mentality.2 19 Active deliberation also encourages citizens "to
take a broader perspective on questions of public policy" and consider the
claims of other citizens, including the police. When applied in the context
of police reform, different groups of community members, including victims of
crime and victims of police misconduct, might come to value each other's
perspective. Similarly, community members can gain insight from police
officers about the daily experiences that shape their reaction to proposed
reform efforts. Finally, deliberation ensures that various groups of
stakeholders involved in developing a policy can learn from each other and
respect the positions of others while continuing to disagree. Although the
benefits of deliberation in the context of police reform may be obvious, the
lack of opportunity for stakeholders to participate and discuss the
implementation of new policies threatens the success of the reforms, because
the lack of participation in police reforms may exacerbate the alienation and
distrust that police officers and citizens already harbor toward each other.
Stakeholder participation is inextricably linked with another bedrock
principle of democratic experimentalism: local experimentation. Democratic
216. William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to
Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 175 (2004) (defining the scope of "Associative
Democracy").
217. See AMY GuTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 39-51
(1996) (discussing the values that inform deliberation and how they affect the democratic process
of governing).
218. See id. at 42 (noting the possible risks and rewards of additional political voices).
219. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
220. Id. (recognizing the importance of a broad focus by citizens in the public forum).
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experimentalism "is based on the belief that the openness of decentralization
and experimentation will ultimately lead to the advancement of knowledge."
221
This paradigm is "built on a vision of 'continuous change and
improvement.' 222  Without stakeholder participation, however, local
experimentation becomes difficult to achieve; in the context of police reform,
the lack of stakeholder participation means that communities cannot actively
participate in setting reform priorities. Thus, such reforms may be ineffective
or viewed with suspicion because there is no connection between the reform
and the community's experiences. For example, use-of-force reforms may
unduly focus on shootings by the police when the community may be equally
concerned about canine deployment in non-threatening encounters. Similarly,
police officers cannot impart valuable information about the importance of
certain policing strategies that may be unpopular but that are necessary for
public safety.
E. The Importance ofAchieving Political Legitimacy in the Police-Reform
Context
The political legitimacy concerns plaguing the general regulatory context are
amplified when formulating rules and regulations impacting the police. The
characteristics defining police culture-such as the code of silence, violence,
and lack of internal discipline-make it difficult for the public to trust police
and may make the public skeptical of efforts to hold police accountable. By
their inherent nature, the operations of police institutions and investigations of
misconduct allegations are "shrouded in secrecy" and shielded from the
public.223 This propensity toward insularity, and the resulting tension between
police officers and their community, lead police and community members alike
to become skeptical of the reform process. The rank-and-file officers abhor
being second-guessed by inexperienced bureaucrats unfamiliar with the
dangers that the officers face on a daily basis. 224  On the other hand,
community members dismiss police-reform attempts as mere "lip service" or
public relations stunts designed to quell tensions after high-profile incidents of
police misconduct.225  This skepticism threatens to undermine the political
legitimacy of any police-reform process. Thus, achieving political legitimacy
221. Kruse, supra note 184, at 677.
222. Id. (quoting Lobel, supra note 182, at 380).
223. AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY
6-7 (1999); see also Davis, supra note 149, at 703-04 (noting that much of the "police policy" is
often "kept secret from those who are affected by it").
224. See, e.g., SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 61, at 221 (discussing the fervent reaction New
York policemen had to the possibility of a civilian review board).
225. See id. at 224 (observing that "when citizens ask for review of police conduct by
civilians, they do so because they don't trust the police to investigate themselves").
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is critical to ensuring that stakeholders, police, and residents "buy in" to the
reforms.
226
1. Historical Tensions Between Police and Their Communities Create a
Sense of Mistrust
In addition to the pathologies prevalent in police organizational culture,
historical tensions between police officers and certain communities in the
United States present additional challenges to the political legitimacy
necessary for meaningful police reform. Police-citizen interactions in poor,
urban, and minority communities have consistently been strained. Numerous
studies and polls show that minority groups have a disturbingly negative
227perception of police officers. The relationship between these two groups has
been fraught with mistrust, and at times, minority communities have erupted in
violence over allegations of police misconduct. 228 Over the last fifty years,
police brutality has sparked many civil disturbances throughout the country.229
Los Angeles has been the site of the most well-known examples of volatility
between police and urban minority communities. In 1965, in the Watts area of
Los Angeles, police arrested Marquette Frye on suspicion of driving while
intoxicated. 230 The arrest drew a crowd, and officers began to beat members of
the crowd with their batons, sparking a five-day riot during which 34 people
were killed, 1000 people were injured, and approximately $183 million of
property damage was incurred.231  Later studies examining the underlying
causes of the riots linked the unrest with growing tensions between the
226. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in
the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489,
537-41 (2008) (advocating the need for stakeholder inclusion in police-reform efforts and the
value of political legitimacy).
227. See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1797 & n.6
(1998) ("Whites rated local police favorably by a margin of 67%-31%" while "blacks rated local
police unfavorably by a margin of 50%-43%."); see also Capers, Testilying, supra note 88, at 844
(summarizing polling statistics showing that sixty-four percent of blacks believe that the police
provide unfair treatment to blacks and that nearly one-fourth of blacks have little confidence in
the police).
228. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 93
(1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION REPORT] (examining the conditions causing violence
to break out in minority communities).
229. See I ANTONY M. PATE & LORIE A. FRIDELL, POLICE USE OF FORCE: OFFICIAL
REPORTS, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 7 (1993) (explaining that
perceptions of police brutality contributed to the Harlem riot in 1935, the Watts riot in 1965,
numerous riots during 1967, and the Miami riot in 1980).
230. Cecilia Rasmussen, Then and Now: 1965-1992, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at A24.
231. See id. (property-damage figure adjusted for inflation); see also KERNER COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 228, at 20 (noting that the Watts riots were triggered by police action and
caused many deaths and millions of dollars in property damage).
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minority city residents and the all-white police department. 232 In 1992, Los
Angeles again erupted in violence after the acquittal of four officers who
233participated in the videotaped beating of Rodney King. In April 2001,
Cincinnati experienced three days of rioting after a police officer shot and
killed unarmed nineteen-year-old, Timothy Thomas. Thomas, who was
wanted for several misdemeanors, was the fifth African American killed by
Cincinnati police officers within a seven-month period and the fifteenth
235African American killed by police since 1995. On November 25, 2006,
New York City police officers shot and killed Sean Bell in a barrage of fifty
bullets hours before his wedding.236 The April 25, 2008, acquittal of the three
officers involved in Bell's death sparked widespread protests among African
Americans across the city.
237
Courts, police experts, and government officials alike have recognized the
negative perceptions that minority communities have of the police. For
example, the Christopher Commission noted that "[w]ithin the minority
communities of Los Angeles, there is a widely-held view that police
misconduct is commonplace." 238  Specifically, the Commission noted that
police officers "frequently treat[ed] minorities differently from whites, more
often using disrespectful and abusive language, employing unnecessarily
intrusive practices . . . and engaging in use of excessive force when dealing
with minorities.' 239 In 1999, then-United States Attorney General Janet Reno
explicitly acknowledged that minority communities' mistrust of police officers
stems from the belief that "police have used excessive force, that law
enforcement is too aggressive, [and] that law enforcement is biased,
disrespectful and unfair."
40
If the distrust among minority communities was simply due to
misperceptions or unsubstantiated allegations of police bias, it might be easier
232. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 61, at 76 (explaining the African American
community's mistrust of the Los Angeles police).
233. Richard A. Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, Trial: Governor Deploys Troops at Mayor's
Request After Arson, Looting Erupt, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at A 1.
234. See Anne Michaud, Cincinnati Cleans up, Amid Many Black- White Questions, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2001, at A6.
235. See Sufiya Abdur-Rahman, NAACP Today: 2008 NAACP Convention, THE CRISIS,
Summer 2008, at 37 (noting the high incidence of African American murders between 1995 and
2001).
236. See Robert D. McFadden, Police Kill Man After a Bachelor Party in Queens, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, at Al.
237. See Nicole Bode, Bell Case Protestors Jam Street at Garden, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May
1, 2008, at 15; Cara Buckley & Thomas J. Lueck, Verdict in Sean Bell Case Draws a Peaceful
Protest, but Some Demand More, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2008, at B3.
238. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 70.
239. Id.
240. Associated Press, Reno Urges Officers to Try to Regain Trust, BALT. SUN, Apr. 16,
1999, at 7A.
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to develop solutions to ease this distrust. Unfortunately, empirical evidence
supports the notion that African Americans' perceptions of mistreatment and
241differential treatment by the criminal-justice system are in fact substantiated.
Some scholars have found that the underlying cause of this distrust is linked to
the excessive force and aggressive policing techniques that police have
.. . ... 242
consistently employed in minority communities. In 1968, the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio noted the link between racism and
the aggressive patrolling of minority communities:
[I]t cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor in police-
community tensions. This is particularly true in situations where the
"stop and frisk" of youths or minority group members is "motivated
by the officers' perceived need to maintain the power image of the
beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone
who attempts to undermine police control of the streets."
2 43
In recent years, the war on drugs has disproportionately impacted minority
communities. These communities are often targeted for drug use even though
244they represent a minority of drug users. Numerous studies indicate that
minority groups, particularly African Americans, experience discriminatory
treatment from police officers245 and are victimized by police officers using
deadly force.246
241. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HUL1NG, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 7-8 (1995) (discussing changes in economic and social
conditions over the past twenty years, which have resulted in high crime rates for African
Americans). African Americans, particularly African American males, are disproportionately
represented at almost all levels of the criminal-justice system. See id. at 1-5, 28-29. For
example, forty-five percent of those arrested for violent crimes are African American, and nearly
one-third of African American men are supervised by the criminal-justice system. See id. at 1.
242. See Capers, Testilying, supra note 88, at 844-46 ("[T]he very fact that most victims of
police brutality are members of poor and minority communities ... contributes to the perception
that the police are more likely to engage in force when dealing with a minority suspect[,] . . . a
perception for which there is evidentiary support.").
243. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.ll (1967) (quoting LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL.,
DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT
AND ENTRAPMENT 47-48 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1967)).
244. See Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the
Constitution, and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 609 (1991) (observing that
eighty to ninety percent of United States drug arrests are of African American males while that
same demographic comprises only twelve percent of the country's drug users).
245. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban Criminal Justice System: Where Young +
Black + Male = Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621, 622-28 (1993) (revealing statistics
showing the discriminatory treatment that police employ against young African American males
through arrests and incarceration).
246. See Mark Blumberg, Police Use of Deadly Force: Exploring Some Key Issues, in
POLICE DEVIANCE 201, 211 (Thomas Barker & David L. Carter eds., 3d ed. 1994) ("All studies
are in agreement that blacks are the victims of police deadly force in numbers disproportionate to
their representation in the general population." (citations omitted)); see also William A. Geller,
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Racial profiling also creates the perception that many police officers,
regardless of their race, harbor and exercise racial animus when policing
communities of color. 247  Studies indicate that many minorities believe that
police are more likely to stop, question, or detain them, as opposed to white
citizens, when investigating crimes. 24  Likewise, empirical evidence reveals
that racial profiling is not a figment of the imagination; rather, it is a
widespread practice employed by police officers in many communities. 249 In
New Jersey, African Americans and Hispanics constituted seventy-eight
percent of "the motorists [that police] stopped and searched. 25° Although
police stopped and searched white individuals far less frequently, officers
uncovered evidence of criminal wrongdoing twenty-five percent of the time
that they searched white motorists. 251 In 1998, African American women were
"9 times more likely than White women who were U.S. citizens to be x-rayed
after being frisked or patted down" by U.S. Customs officers even though they
were found to be "less than half as likely to be found carrying contraband. 2 2
In New York City, Mayor Rudy Giuliani's quality-of-life policing initiatives,
implemented in the early 1990s, resulted in police officers stopping and
Deadly Force: What We Know, 10 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 151, 163 (1982) (noting the
disproportionate rate of police shootings involving African Americans).
247. See Capers, Testilying, supra note 88, at 842-44, 849; Brandon Garrett, Remedying
Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 58 (2001).
248. See Capers, Testilying, supra note 88, at 844; Garrett, supra note 247, at 52-53. The
term "racial profiling," which generally connotes an illegitimate practice, can sometimes be
difficult to define and differentiate from legitimate means of criminal profiling, but it is generally
defined as occurring "whenever a law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or
otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that members of that person's racial
or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit the sort of crime the officer
is investigating." See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002); see also Capers, Testilying, supra note 88, at 849 (citing a
Gallup poll indicating that forty percent of African Americans "who had been pulled over for
traffic stops believed that the police had targeted them" specifically based on their race).
249. See Capers, Testilying, supra note 88, at 849-52.
250. Id. at 850.
251. Id. Similarly, in Maryland, although African Americans constituted "only 17.5% of the
drivers violating traffic laws" on a particular stretch of Interstate 95, they comprised "72.9% of all
of the drivers that were stopped and searched along [that] stretch." Id. "Similar studies in other
jurisdictions have produced similar data." See id at 850 & n.86 (listing evidence of racial
profiling in several American cities).
252. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-00-150, U.S. CUSTOMS
SERVICE: OBSERVATIONS ON SELECTED OPERATIONS AND PROGRAM ISSUES 10 (2000); see also
Capers, Testilying, supra note 88, at 851 & n.87 (stating that studies have revealed that African
American women are searched more frequently than others in airports); John Gibeaut, Marked for
Humiliation, 85 A.B.A. J. 46, 46 (1999) (describing experiences of African American women
frequently being strip-searched in airports); Black Women Searched More, Study Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at A]7.
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frisking a disproportionate number of racial minorities.253  Recent data
demonstrates that police in New York City continue to stop and frisk African
Americans and Hispanics in numbers disproportionate to their representation in
the general population.254 In 2006, out of 508,540 reported stops by police,
55% involved African Americans, 30% involved Hispanics, and 11% involved
whites. 255  In addition to excessive force and racial profiling dominating
minority communities, under-enforcement of crime in the African American
community is another source of tension between minority communities and
police.
256
Given the distrust of police that exists within certain communities, it is
logical that residents may view police-reform efforts with skepticism and•• 257
cynicism. Those citizens who view the criminal-justice system as corrupt
and police officers as agents of a biased system will also likely view reform
measures as illegitimate.258  To counteract this perception of illegitimacy,
scholars have argued for increased transparency in policing as part of any
reform effort. 259 What scholars have not addressed is how best to achieve this
253. See OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN. OF N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S
"STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL vii-xii (1999), available at
http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/scandoclinks/ocm43937374.htm (reporting disparities in New York
City stop rates between minorities and whites during the 1990s); Reenah L. Kim, Note,
Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policing: The Need for Democratically Negotiated
Community Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 464
n.12 (2001); see also Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms
Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L.
REV. 1253, 1273-77 (2000) (describing Mayor Giuliani's quality-of-life policing initiatives of the
1990s).
254. See, e.g., Christopher Dunn, NYPD Stops and Frisks and the Fourth Amendment,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 2007, at 3.
255. See id; see also Tim Roche & Constance Humburg, Stops Far Too Routine for Many
Blacks, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997, at IA (reporting statistics indicating a
disproportionate number of stops and frisks of minorities).
256. See Capers, Testilying, supra note 88, at 853.
257. See id. at 840-42, 871-73 (discussing the important link between perceived legitimacy
of the criminal-justice system and crime prevention); David Cole, Foreword, Discretion and
Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J.
1059, 1091-92 (1999).
258. See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391,
392-93 (2000) (arguing that strong relationships between citizens and law enforcement lead to
compliance with the law); Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization andDrug Law Enforcement, 35
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 193-94 (1998) (finding that stigmatization of African Americans by
police impedes adherence to law).
259. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 917 (2006). Some scholars have broadened this perception of insularity
beyond police officials to include many other professionals in the criminal-justice system,
including judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. See, e.g., id. at 911-18 (describing the
relationship between trust and legitimacy of the criminal-justice system). Policing and police
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transparency given the cultural and organizational impediments inherent in
law-enforcement institutions. Borrowing from the regulatory context, New
Governance theories-such as democratic experimentalism, which emphasizes
a bottom-up approach to problem-solving and local experimentation-could be
beneficial in restoring dialogue among affected stakeholders.
V. MEASURING UP
A. Current Federal Efforts to Reform Local Police Departments Systemically
and the Ideals of Democratic Experimentalism
The tenets of democratic experimentalism address many of the issues
impeding police reform, particularly those in which political legitimacy is a
concern. Drawing from the framework of New Governance theories,
policymakers should craft reforms that restore political legitimacy by
encouraging deliberation among stakeholders. Current reform efforts under §
14141, however, fail to reflect adequately the ideals of the New Governance
theoretical framework. Instead, the current § 14141 reform process lacks
several key components of democratic experimentalism and dangerously
parallels traditional top-down regulation eschewed in New Governance
scholarship.
1. Section 14141 Takes a Top-Down Approach to Police Reform that
Excludes Stakeholders and Impedes Local Experimentation
The current federal police-reform process is reminiscent of top-down
command-and-control regulation as opposed to a bottom-up approach that
considers the viewpoints of a wide range of potential stakeholders. The DOJ
currently lacks a mandate and a mechanism to include rank-and-file police
officers, community members, or other interest groups that may have a stake in
the reform process. 26 These exclusions threaten the legitimacy of the reform
process at its inception and the sustainability of any progress made by the DOJ
through consent decrees or MOAs.2 6
There is very little opportunity to engage in local experimentation (another
cornerstone of democratic experimentalism), because the current
implementation process excludes important stakeholders. 262  Many of the
proposed police reforms are "drawn from recognized 'best practices' related to
accountability already in place in other more progressive police
reform represent only a few areas in the criminal-justice system in which a lack of transparency
threatens the legitimacy of the system.
260. See Simmons, supra note 226, at 494.
261. Garrett, supra note 247, at 45.
262. See id. at 101 (noting that federal reforms make it difficult for community members to
intervene).
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departments. '" 263 Although these broad principles are a useful starting point to
guide the reform process, the DOJ should also actively encourage local police
departments to develop solutions specially tailored to their jurisdictions.
264
Without a structure currently in place for community groups to influence
reforms, it is difficult to discern whether the reform policies adequately reflect
the sentiment of those most affected by them-the citizens of the affected
community. Under the Bush Administration's practice of issuing technical
assistance letters, a formal mechanism enabling local groups to inform the DOJ
and police of their priorities appeared to be lacking. Similarly, rank-and-file
officers are without the opportunity to express their own views about the
technical-assistance-letter recommendations. As a result, police officers have
little hope that the DOJ, the city, or community residents will consider their
concerns.
Additionally, the local nature of policing and police reform raises obvious
federalism concerns when the federal government directs the implementation
of state or city police reforms. 265 Opponents of increased federal involvement
in police reform will likely argue that local entities must retain control. They
will insist, perhaps correctly, that issues involving law-enforcement agencies
are best handled at the local level by locally elected or appointed officials who
are most familiar with the specialized needs of particular communities. 266 The
DOJ should certainly offer expertise and promote broad principles for police
reform, but a one-size-fits-all approach-whether real or perceived-is
inappropriate. The greater local experimentation, stakeholder participation,
information sharing, and flexibility that is characteristic of the New
Governance paradigm is superior to top-down approaches that have
consistently failed to achieve legitimacy.
2. The DOJ's Implementation of the Pattern or Practice Legislation Fails to
Encourage Information Sharing Among Affected Jurisdictions
Many of the DOJ's suggested reforms require police departments to collect
detailed information about both personnel and local police practices. There is
no evidence, however, that jurisdictions affected by the legislation are
encouraged to analyze the data or share information with the public during the
reform process.267 The information collected is generally retained internally,
263. Walker, The New Paradigm, supra note 22, at 5-6; see also Garrett, supra note 247, at
96.
264. See Garrett, supra note 247, at 96.
265. See id. at 74-76.
266. See Rob Yale, Searching for the Consequences of Police Brutality, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1841, 1852-53 (1997) (concluding that local law-enforcement agencies are best suited to curb
police brutality).
267. See Garrett, supra note 247, at 83-85.
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and there is no requirement that the information be disclosed to the public.268
In recent years, the DOJ has even ceased entering into MOAs with binding
conditions; rather, the DOJ has sent letters merely recommending technical
assistance to jurisdictions requiring reform. 269
The DOJ has ignored the recommendations of scholars and policymakers to
enforce aggressively § 14141; thus, to date, the DOJ has entered into consent
decrees or MOAs with relatively few police departments and has filed even
fewer civil suits under § 14141. 2" The propensity to issue technical assistance
letters to troubled police departments severely hampers the transparency of the
accountability process because there is less public awareness of technical
assistance letters than there is of consent decrees, MOAs, or lawsuits.
Therefore, even if the DOJ encouraged and enabled these local police agencies
to share information, there would be few cases to provide meaningful
comparisons. Similarly, the affected jurisdictions tend to be small cities and
towns rather than large urban police departments widely known to have a
271history of police corruption and misconduct. Under a purely democratic
experimentalist program, these local entities would operate as local
laboratories in the police-reform movement.272
3. Implementation of§ 14141 Does Not Encourage Flexible and Continuous
Reform
In order to bring the DOJ's Pattern or Practice legislation under the umbrella
of the New Governance paradigm, greater emphasis should be placed on
flexibility and continuous reform. In the past, once the police department had
satisfied the terms of the MOA, the DOJ's relationship with, and monitoring
273of, the police department ended. Once the police department complied with
the DOJ's terms, the federal government's role ended, thus leaving no means
to ensure that the department adhered to the reforms.
4. Learning by Monitoring
All MOAs and consent decrees to date have included provisions for the
selection of an Independent Monitor, who is chosen collectively by the city,
268. Id. at 101.
269. See Simmons, supra note 226, at 511.
270. See Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence, supra note 43, at 1407-08; Jacobi, supra note
97, at 833-34; Livingston, supra note 91, at 815-16.
271. See Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence, supra note 43, at 1407-08.
272. See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 184, at 693 (describing Wisconsin's innocence reforms as
experimental "because they are a state-level experiment in criminal procedural regulation").
273. Each consent decree and MOA establishes a timeline for investigation and compliance
with reforms. See, e.g., Cincinnati MOA, supra note 133, at 9 109-11; District of Columbia
MOA, supra note 134, at 99 181-82; Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 128, at 99 178-79;
Pittsburgh Consent Decree, supra note 130, at 99 78-79.
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the law-enforcement agency, and the DOJ.2 74  The Independent Monitor
reviews and reports on the police department's compliance with the agreement.
The recent practice of sending technical assistance letters, however, has no
analogous requirement.
275
B. All Is Not Lost: A Sustainable Institutional Structure
Despite the shortcomings of federal efforts to induce changes in police
institutions, police-accountability reform under § 14141 nevertheless offers an
institutional framework that could incubate and sustain democratic
experimentalism ideals. Unlike other police-reform efforts, the DOJ's Pattern
or Practice legislation offers an institutional framework that is easily adaptable
to stakeholder inclusion and other facets of democratic experimentalism. The
DOJ already works in conjunction with city officials and police executives,
and as such, the reform process is amenable to broader stakeholder
participation. The DOJ should actively identify additional stakeholders in the
jurisdictions affected by its Pattern or Practice legislation and invite them to
276participate in developing and considering the reforms.
Although certain programs embody characteristics of the democratic
experimentalist paradigm, it is difficult to find programs that fully exemplify
democratic experimentalism. 277 In fact, some scholars have acknowledged that
"a full-blown experimentalist regulatory regime has not fully emerged in the
world., 278 However, a few changes in the DOJ's current implementation of §
14141 could push police reform toward the ideal of democratic
experimentalism: for example, a mechanism to promote inclusion of
stakeholders and make more data available to the public. Cincinnati's
approach to police accountability illustrates this concept by reflecting a more
274. See, e.g., Cincinnati MOA, supra note 133, at 92; District of Columbia MOA, supra
note 134, at 161; Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 128, at 158; Pittsburgh Consent
Decree, supra note 130, at 70.
275. See, e.g., Letter from Shanetta Y. Cutlar to Frank James, supra note 117, at 1-2.
276. This Article does not seek to offer a detailed summary of the various ways that the DOJ
could achieve and implement broader stakeholder participation. A process akin to negotiated
rulemaking, however, provides a detailed framework for considering stakeholder selection and
participation in developing police reforms. See generally Simmons, supra note 226, at 539-41
(advocating the application of negotiated rulemaking procedures in police-reform efforts as a
means of ensuring stakeholder participation).
277. For descriptions of programs and reform efforts that embody aspects of democratic
experimentalism, see, e.g., James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 213-29 (2003) (describing new developments in school reform and
explaining how this bottom-up reform embodies democratic experimentalist ideals).
278. See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 184 (analyzing the Wisconsin innocence reforms in the
context of democratic experimentalism).
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democratic experimentalist model, which values deliberation by incorporating
279community feedback and participation in police-reform strategies.
C. Learning from Locals
1. The Paradigmatic Shift from Professional-Era Policing to Community
Policing Provides Precedent for Police- Community Interaction
With its emphasis on bottom-up approaches, strands of the New Governance
framework are evident in what has now become the dominant model of
policing in the United States: community policing, also referred to as
community-oriented policing. The community-policing model, consistent with
New Governance approaches to reform, emphasizes a bottom-up approach to
crime prevention and encourages collaborative problem-solving. This model
has replaced the traditional professional model of policing that is characterized
by top-down approaches to crime control. The shift in policing models across
the country parallels the shift that must now take place in police reform. This
shift not only supports the proposition that the "new paradigm of policing"
should embody features of the New Governance theoretical framework, but it
also provides precedent for police-community interactions that are critical to
implementing sustainable reforms.
At the turn of the century, there was "widespread sentiment that intimacy
between the police and the community, as well as between the police and
political leaders, had encouraged police corruption," which "had resulted in the
targeting of outsiders for 'curbstone justice'-particularly those outsiders who
belonged to minority ethnic and racial groups., 280 The professionalization of
police departments emerged as a response intended to establish legitimacy and
fairness. The police forces of the professional era operated independently,
and their sole directive was to combat crime and secure arrests.82 These
crime-control efforts occurred largely to the exclusion of the community and
"[a]ctivities that drew the police into solving other kinds of community
problems . . . were identified as 'social work,' and became the object of
derision." 283 Experts believed that the most efficient and effective means for
279. See infra Part V.C.2 (examining recent police reform in Cincinnati, Ohio).
280. Waldeck, supra note 253, at 1261.
281. Id. at 1260-62.
282. See, e.g., KELLING, supra note 11, at 5 ("[P]olice in the reform era moved to narrow
their functioning to crime control and criminal apprehension. Police agencies became law
enforcement agencies.").
283. See GEORGE L. KELLING & MARK H. MOORE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EVOLVING
STRATEGY OF POLICING 5-6 (1988). Anthony C. Thompson noted that
[t]he traditional form of professional policing is reactive in nature. The police respond to
complaints and only pursue those crimes in which victims and witnesses are ready and
willing to cooperate in the processing of a criminal case. Police rarely interact with
members of the community except in connection with the investigation of a specific crime:
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police departments to implement crime control was through a detached and
hierarchical organizational structure. 284  The professional-era organizational
subculture was characterized by the "brotherhood in blue" and an "us versus
them" mentality.285 The purpose of the professional model was "to develop a
paramilitary team of officers able to respond with speed and force to quell
criminal disturbances in the community." 286 Technological developments of
the twentieth century enabled officers to respond quickly to emergencies and
distanced police from their communities, allowing them to wait at the police
287station or in patrol cars for emergency calls to be dispatched. William J.
Bratton, former New York Police Department Commissioner, developed the
"three Rs" to describe the professional era of policing: "rapid response,"
"random patrol," and "reactive investigation after the crime occurred. 2 8
Officers exhibited "semi-automatic" responses to crime rather than taking
deliberate, preventative measures to improve communities while citizens
occupied a merely passive role in the professional-policing model.289
The professional model of policing began its decline as policing experts and
citizens alike questioned the model's effectiveness and its theoretical
underpinnings. 29  More importantly, the professional model of policing
became unworkable due to rising tensions between police officers and
291
minorities, who had suffered disparate treatment by officers. Additionally,the militaristic, hierarchical, and detached professional-policing model
when the officers are not working on a specific case, they cruise the neighborhood in a
patrol car or wait at the precinct station house to be dispatched to the scene of a crime.
Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 339
(2002); see also Waldeck, supra note 253, at 1261 (noting that in some jurisdictions, police were
not allowed to live in the "beats" that they patrolled).
284. See Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, in
POLICING: KEY READINGS 392, 393-94 (Tim Newburn ed., 2005).
285. See Waldeck, supra note 253, at 1265.
286. See Thomas M. Riordan, Copping an Attitude: Rule of Law Lessons from the Rodney
King Incident, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 675, 726 (1994) ("The philosophy behind this type of
policing is simply to put away the bad guys.").
287. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 567 (1997).
288. William J. Bratton, New Strategies for Combating Crime in New York City, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 781, 782 (1996).
289. Michael S. Scott, Community Justice in Policing, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 415, 416-17 (2006)
(describing the role of citizens as witnesses or crime reporters, but not as proactive in policing the
community).
290. See Waldeck, supra note 253, at 1262 ("Regardless of increases in the sizes of police
departments and technological advances, the police were not becoming more effective in
controlling crime.").
291. See id (stating that "minorities began to protest mistreatment by officers and the
insufficient levels of police services with which they had been provided").
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increased hostility toward police and impaired community wellness. 292  The
traditional policing model created a large rift between police and particular
communities such that the two became distrustful of each other, leading to an
increase in crime incidents. Rising antagonism between the police and the
public required a new model. Community policing developed from this
need.293
Early attempts to implement problem-oriented policing began in the 1970s.
Herman Goldstein, John Alderson, James Q. Wilson, and George Kelling are
credited with developing community-oriented policing concepts, such as
"problem solving by beat officers" and "the idea that experiments should be
systematically evaluated., 294  During the 1980s, law-enforcement agencies
throughout the United States began to implement community-policing
strategies, and by 1994, then-Attorney General Janet Reno opened the DOJ
Office of Community Oriented Policing (COPS), officially signaling "that
community policing had arrived in American law enforcement."
295
292. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 369 (2001). Tyler argues that
the effort to exert control over citizens that is central to command and control styles of
legal authority can itself increase danger for and risk to the police and . . . community
residents. In the case of the police, by approaching people from a dominance perspective,
police officers encourage resistance and defiance, create hostility, and increase the
likelihood that confrontations will escalate into struggles over dominance that are based on
force. The police may begin a spiral of conflict that increases the risks of harm for both
the police and for the public.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Riordan, supra note 286, at 727 (stating that the professional
police model "tends to inculcate members of the police force with an 'us versus them' siege
mentality"). Riordan further explains that
[t]he professional model emphasizes "crime control over crime prevention and isolate[s]
the police from the communities and the people they serve." Consequently, the police
consider residents living in high-crime areas as potential criminals, instead of possible
victims; in turn, those people fear, resent, and distrust the police "command presence."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 14, at 98-100).
293. James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2004).
294. WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNEIT, COMMUNITY POLICING: CHICAGO
STYLE 10 (1997).
295. Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1596-97
(2002). Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett describe community policing as
an organizational strategy that redefines the goals of policing, but leaves the means of
achieving them to practitioners in the field. It is a process rather than a product. Efforts to
do it share some general features, however. Community policing relies upon
organizational decentralization and a reorientation of patrol in order to facilitate two-way
communication between police and the public. It assumes a commitment to broadly
focused, problem-oriented policing and requires that police be responsive to citizens'
demands when they decide what local problems are and set their priorities. It also implies
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Community policing has developed as the antithesis to the professional model
of policing and rejects the "arrogant, heavy-handed, technologically driven,
and aloof' nature that epitomized the traditional professional-policing models
formerly employed by many police departments, such as the LAPD.2 9 The
community model's four general principles include: (1) "organizational
decentralization and a reorientation of patrol in order to facilitate
communication between police and the public"; (2) "commitment to broadly
focused, problem-oriented policing"; (3) "police respond[ing] to the public
when they set priorities and develop their tactics"; and (4) "commitment to
helping neighborhoods solve crime problems on their own, through community
,,297
organizations and crime-prevention programs. In stark contrast to the
command-and-control style policing that the community model replaced,
community policing encourages residents to partner with police and promotes
community participation in prioritizing shared problems.298  Because
community-policing models are based on consent, they foster legitimate crime-
.... 299
prevention strategies in neighborhoods where they are employed. The same
community-police interaction advocated by democratic experimentalist models
could help establish legitimacy in the context of police reform.
2. Cincinnati's Multistakeholder Approach to Police Accountability
In addition to community policing, the efforts used in Cincinnati, Ohio, to
implement systemic police reforms exemplify New Governance principles in
action within the context of reforming police institutions. Cincinnati's reform
process embodies many of the principles espoused by New Governance
theorists and illustrates the collaborative efforts in which police and citizens
can engage to design a reform process that maintains political legitimacy.
Following the 2001 fatal shooting of an unarmed African American man in
Cincinnati, the city erupted in riots.3 ° ° At that time, the Cincinnati Police
Department and inner city minority communities were engaged in a volatile
a commitment to helping neighborhoods solve crime problems on their own, through
community organizations and crime prevention programs.
SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 294, at 5.
296. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1779
(2005).
297. SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 294, at 6-8.
298. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 52-54
(2004) (considering the role community policing plays in diffusing tensions between the
community and the police).
299. See Kim, supra note 253, at 462, 476 ("[B]asic models for both civilian oversight and
community policing represent mechanisms by which communities might exert control over the
police, not only with respect to harmful practices but also with respect to the establishment of
local policing priorities.").
300. Jay Rothman & Randi Land, The Cincinnati Police-Community Relations Collaborative,
18 CRIM. JUST. 35, 36-37 (2004).
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relationship; this incident represented the fifteenth fatal police shooting of an
African American within a six-year period. 30 1 The 2001 shooting precipitated
the DOJ's investigation pursuant to § 14141, which led to the discovery of a
pattern of constitutional violations within the Cincinnati Police Department.
30 2
On March 15, 2001, the Ohio chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union,
in conjunction with the Cincinnati Black United Front, initiated a suit,
unrelated to the DOJ's investigation, against the city on behalf of a plaintiff
alleging racial profiling. 30 3 The federal judge handling the racial-profiling suit,
Judge Susan J. Dlott, believed that the complex issues involved carried "such
deep emotional content" that an adversarial proceeding was improper to
dispose of the issues.304  Instead, the court urged the parties to reach a
settlement, which culminated in the adoption of a collaborative agreement
involving citizens, the municipality, and police officers.
30 5
The parties agreed to negotiate, and they also invited the local chapter of the
Fraternal Order of Police, the local police union, to take part in the
negotiations. 306 Judge Dlott appointed a local conflict resolution specialist as
special master to direct the negotiation. 307 An advisory group consisting of
attorneys and key stakeholders was formed to negotiate a collaborative
308settlement that was ultimately executed in April 2002. The collaborative
settlement stipulated, among other things, that the City must adhere to the
provisions set forth in its MOA with the DOJ pursuant to § 14141.309 Judge
Dlott described the details of the collaborative agreement as follows:
[T]he collaborative will include an opportunity to receive the
viewpoints of all persons in the Cincinnati community regarding
their goals for community-police relations. . . . The collaborative
will include an opportunity for dialogue about these responses in
structured group sessions.... [T]he collaborative will also include a
301. Id. at 35-36; see also Abdur-Rahman, supra note 235, at 37.
302. See CINCINNATI POLICE DEP'T, FIFTH STATUS REPORT TO THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR
2 (2003). In April 2001, the Mayor of Cincinnati requested that the DOJ conduct a review of the
Cincinnati Police Department's policies and procedures, specifically those regarding the use of
force. See id
303. Rothman & Land, supra note 300, at 35-36 (discussing the case of Bomani Tyehimba,
"an African American businessman who claimed that two police officers had violated his civil
rights by handcuffing him and unjustifiably pointing a gun at his head during a traffic stop").
304. Id at 36.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id
309. Collaborative Agreement at 16, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. C-1-99-317 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 12, 2001); see also CINCINNATI POLICE DEP'T, supra note 302, at 2.
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process for expert analysis of the current practices of the Cincinnati
Police Division (CPD) and [best] practices in other communities. 310
As it unfolded, Cincinnati's approach to police reform exemplified the
"bottom-up" approach encouraged by the New Governance paradigm. The
advisory group sought participation from many constituencies across the city
and organized the constituents into eight stakeholder groups, including
"African American citizens, city employees, police and their families, white
citizens, business/foundation!education leaders, religious and social service
leaders, youth, and other minorities." 311 Through the media, these groups were
invited to complete questionnaires and participate in feedback groups. The
advisory group also sought the assistance of a policing expert to research the
best practices and model programs in order to make recommendations to the
interested parties.3 13 Besides responding to the questionnaires, over 700
citizens participated in group meetings with members of their stakeholder
groups.314 Finally, in April 2002, the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement was
signed; it included, among other things, substantive changes on ways to rally
community members through problem-oriented policing, use-of-force
reporting, external criticism of the agreement's execution, collaboration by the
parties to maintain fair treatment of all citizens, and citizen review
315processes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The new paradigm of policing attempts to address many negative aspects of
police culture that continue to plague local law-enforcement agencies
nationwide. Increased transparency and accountability have become hallmarks
of this new paradigm. Unfortunately, political legitimacy issues stemming
from historical tensions between police and citizens threaten to undermine and
impede the progress of these reforms. New Governance principles,
particularly the characteristics of democratic experimentalism, include
promising features on which police reforms should be based to ensure their
political legitimacy and long-term sustainability. The current federal efforts to
promote police accountability at the local level are necessary, but they must
include opportunities for local experimentation and stakeholder deliberation in
order to maintain the legitimacy of these reforms. The shift from professional-
310. Order Establishing Collaborative Procedure at 3, Tyehimba v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-
1-99-317 (S.D. Ohio May 3, 2001).
311. Rothman & Land, supra note 300, at 37.
312. Id. The questionnaires asked about the goals each group had for "future police-
community relations in Cincinnati," the reasons these goals were important, and the ways in
which these goals could be achieved. Id. Over 3500 people answered the questionnaires. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 38.
315. Id. at 39.
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era policing to community-policing models underscores the need for police-
citizen interaction and lends support to the proposition that these groups can
collaborate to solve issues of local relevance. Benefits of such interaction are
not, however, limited to crime-prevention models. As the Cincinnati police-
reform process demonstrates, police and citizens can work together to develop
policies governing the conduct of the police. Drawing from democratic
experimentalist models to effectuate stakeholder participation, deliberation and
local experimentation will legitimize these police-reform efforts and ensure the
overall quality and sustainability of police-accountability measures.
